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W e  present a  logic for reasoning with complex objects, which is a  repaired and  significantly 
ex tended version of Maier’s O-logic [43]. The  logic naturally supports complex objects, 
object identity, and  deduct ion, and  has  several other interesting features. It elegantly combines 
object-oriented and  value-oriented paradigms and,  in particular, contains all of predicate 
calculus as  a  special case. The  revised O-logic has  a  sound and  complete resolut ion-based 
proof procedure.  0 1993 Academic Press, Inc. 
1. PREFACE 
In the past few years, considerable interest arose in the so-called object-oriented 
approach to databases. Although there is no  consensus regarding what an  object- 
oriented approach precisely means,  either in programming languages or in 
databases, a  number  of concepts have been  identified as its most salient features. 
According to [lo, 51, 58, 591  and  a  number  of other surveys, these concepts are: 
complex objects, inheritance, class/subclass classification, and  object identity. In 
parallel, the deductive approach gained enormous popularity both in programming 
languages and  databases, and  it became apparent that deduct ion is very desirable 
in object-oriented languages as well. Furthermore, the desire here is to have a  
“logic-programmable” deduction. In this respect, relational calculus-like deduct ion 
does not fully meet this goal, and  a  full-fledged locic is needed.  Many attempts have 
been  made  to combine the two approaches [l, 2, 4, 8, 9, 13, 14, 38, 43, 451. 
Although each approach was an  important step forward; in our opinion, none  of 
them succeed in achieving the above goals satisfactorily. 
In [52], it is claimed that the deductive approach is intrinsically “value-oriented” 
and  therefore cannot be  combined with the inherently object-oriented features, such 
as object identity. The  work reported here seems to suggest otherwise: we present 
a  logic language with a  well-defined semantics that extends predicate calculus and  
accommodates deduct ion with complex objects and  object identity. Furthermore, 
value-oriented entities (i.e., the ones that are determined solely by the values of 
* Supported in part by  the NSF Grant DCR-8603676;  a  preliminary report on  this research appeared 
in “Proceedings of the 8  th ACM SIGACT-SIGMOD-SIGART Symposium on  Principles of Database 
Systems.” 
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their attributes) and object-oriented entities (i.e., those determined by object 
identities) can be mixed freely in one program and even in one clause. 
Our work is based on O-logic proposed by Maier [43], which, unfortunately, 
had a number of semantic flaws. Luckily, Maier’s basic insight into the problem 
proved to be very fruitful, and our revised version of O-logic does not suffer from 
these difficulties. We have also significantly extended the semantics to include sets, 
inconsistency-tolerance, and equality and provided a sound and complete resolu- 
tion-based proof procedure, which makes O-logic also computationally attractive. 
Table I illustrates the standing of various proposals with respect to the goals 
declared earlier. Because of the abundance of different logic-based approaches to 
object-oriented databases, we are unable to discuss all of them in detail; the table 
indicates only the most salient features of each proposal. A more thorough com- 
parison with some of these works appears in the main body of the paper. It should 
be noted that none of the approaches listed below fully incorporates the inheritance 
mechanism. What is referred to as “inheritance” in most cases is a simple class-sub- 
class classification, but subclasses do not really inherit values from superclasses. An 
extension of the present work that accommodates inheritance with overriding is 
presented in [34]. In Table I, (a) indicates calculus-based languages where recur- 
sion is not allowed. Although recursion can be expressed using the power-set 
operator [ 1,261, calculus-based languages are too inflexible for general-purpose 
logic programming. Superscipt (b) indicates proposals whose deduction is restricted 
to a subset of logic (normally Horn or extended Horn rules) or those relying on 
extra-logical features. (c) marks proposals that restrict sets to be finite. Further- 
more, some works either permit no sets or allow only acyclic objects; this is also 
indicated in the table. 
There is also a different (orthogonal, in a sense) stream of object-oriented 
database research that does not state the development of an object-oriented logic 
TABLE I 
Language Complex objects Class/subclass Object identity 
NFNF [45] Acyclic No No 
LDM [38] Yes No Yes 
cc0 [9] Acyclic Possible No 
LDL [13] Acyclic No No 
COL [23 Acyclic’ No No 
ELPS [39] Acyclic’ No No 
Abiteboul-Beeri [ 1 ] Acyclic No No 
Rubinski [46] Yes Yes Yes 
V-terms Cl43 Yes Yes No 
IQL C41 Yes Yes Yes 
C-Logic [ 191’ Sets only Yes Yes 
O-logic (Maier’s) No sets Yes Yes 
O-logic (ours) Yes Yes Yes 
1 C-logic [19] is a proper subset of the extended O-logic presented in this paper. 
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language as its main goal (e.g., [ 11, 36, 40, 411). The effort here is directed towards 
designing a procedural object-oriented language supported by a formal data model. 
In the present paper, we will not discuss and/or compare these works with ours. 
This manuscript mostly deals with general aspects of the proposed logic, such as 
its model theory, resolution-based theorem proving and treatment of sets. However, 
Section 10 also outlines a logic programming semantics, thereby laying foundations 
for a theory of object-oriented logic programming. 
The relationship of our work to frame-based languages in AI is worth noting 
also. Marriage of frames with deduction has been a hit in AI for quite some time 
(e.g., [23]), but no semantically solid and yet comprehensive theory has ever been 
proposed. Frames are essentially scaled-down versions of complex objects (plus 
inheritance), and pointers referring to other frames are conceptually nothing else 
but object identities. Although Hayes has shown that certain features attributed to 
frames can be translated into predicate calculus [27], this translation does not 
provide a direct semantics for frames and does not capture many aspects naturally 
enough. To our knowledge, the present work is the first comprehensive approach 
that directly marries deduction with several important aspects of frames with the 
blessing of a respectable logical theory; [32, 341 are further steps in this direction. 
2. INTRODUCTION TO 0-LoGIc 
From now on, the term O-logic will refer to our version of the formalism; when 
mentioning Maier’s original O-logic [43], suitable qualifiers will be added. In this 
section we introduce the syntax and semantics of our language. Basic knowledge of 
logic programming and deductive databases on the level of the first few chapters of 
[42, 533 is assumed. 
2.1. Syntax 
An alphabet of O-logic consists of: 
(1) A possibly infinite set F  of object constructors; 
(2) A possibly infinite set A, of single-valued (also called functional) 
attributes; 
(3) A possibly infinite set A, of set-valued attributes; 
(4) A possibly infinite collection Z  of class names; 
(5) An infinite set V of object variables; 
(6) Logical connectives v , A, ~3, 1, and quantifiers V, 3. 
Additional alphabet symbols such as parentheses and arrows will be introduced as 
we go. We assume that the sets F, A,, A,, V, and Z are disjoint. 
Object constructors play the role offunction symbols in O-logic and we will use 
the terms “object constructor” and “function symbol” interchangeably. Every 
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symbol f E F has an a&y---a nonnegative integer specifying the number of 
arguments f can take. 0-ary symbols in F are called constants. 
An id-term is a term composed out of object constructors (members of F) and 
object variables (members of V) in the usual way (e.g., f(a, g(X, b)), where f, g are 
binary object constructors, a and b are constants, and X is a variable). The set of 
all ground (i.e., variable-free) terms is denoted by F*. Conceptually, each element 
of F* can be viewed as an object denotation or “name,” which is a logical abstrac- 
tion corresponding to the concept of object identity [29]-an ad hoc notion that is 
omnipresent in object-oriented systems. However, unlike most such languages, we 
do allow the same object to have more than one denotation (and thus more than 
one object id). For instance, in O-logic one can state john =futher(mary), thereby 
making iohn and falher(mary) refer to the same object. This view of object ids as 
object denotations or names seems to be quite common in AI. In contrast, database 
languages usually insist on uniqueness of an id per object, which stems from the 
narrow implementational concerns, but is not well-motivated otherwise. 
Thoughout this paper we will use symbols starting with lower-case letters to 
denote ground (i.e., variable-free) terms; symbols beginning with capital letters will 
be used to denote terms that may or may not contain variables. Emboldened lower- 
case letters will ‘denote classes (the elements of C). Also, to eliminate needless 
repetitions, we will be consistently using the symbols V, F, F*, A_, A+, C to 
denote the sets of variables, function symbols, etc., of some language L that will be 
either known from the context or immaterial. 
We define O-terms along the lines of [43], extending them to include sets and 
class-hierarchies. An O-term (an O-logic term) is either 
(1) A typing O-term T: p, where T is an id-term and p E C is a class name; 
(2) An is-a O-term p: q, where p, q EC are class names; or 
(3) A complex O-term T[funA, -+ T,, . . . . funA, + T,,, setA, --H { S1, 1, . . . . 
s*, m, 15 .a*> set-& - (Sk, 1, . . . . Sk, mk } 1, where T is an id-term, funAi E A, are 
functional attributes, and setAj E A- are set-valued attributes; T,, Sj, , are complex 
O-terms. We will often refer to T as the id of the above O-term. 
Typing O-terms classify objects into classes (e.g., john: student), while is-a O-terms 
organize classes into ISA-hierarchies (e.g., faculty: employee). Complex O-terms 
are assertions about various properties of objects represented by id-terms, e.g., 
futher(john)[uge + 30, salary --) 2OK, children - {mury,john}]. As their name 
suggests, functional attributes (such as age above) are used to represent functional 
properties of objects (futher( john), in this case), that is, properties that are 
described by exactly one value-object (30, in our example). The term “value-object” 
is used informally here and is intended to foster the reader’s intuition that, say, 
30 is an object (actually, an object denotation) returned by the attribute age in 
the context of the object futher(john). Likewise, set-valued attributes represent 
properties that return sets of objects as.their values (cf. children). 
To endow the reader with a proper intuition about the intended meaning of 
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complex O-terms, we will jump ahead and remark that more than one such O-term 
may describe the same object. For instance, an object bob may be described 
by a pair of complex O-terms bob[name + “Bob,” children --t) {mary )] and 
bobcage + 50, children -H {bill}], each supplying part of the information about 
bob. According to the semantics given in the next subsection, this pair of O-terms 
is equivalent to the following single O-term: bob[name + “Bob,” age + 50, 
children --tt {mary, bill}]. Another important observation concerning the definition 
of complex O-terms is that they may occur inside other O-terms in a “value”-posi- 
tion,’ e.g., bob[children -H {mury[uge + 151, bill}, age + SO[type + “integer”]]. 
In Section 2.2, we shall see that this is actually equivalent to a conjunction of 
simpler O-terms: bob[children -++ {mury, bill), age --) 501, mury[uge + 153, and 
50[ type + “integer”]. 
An O-term is also a moleculur2 O-formula. O-formulae are obtained from other 
(simpler) O-formulae by means of logical connectives v , A , 1, and quantifiers 3 
and V. In the programming examples, however, we will use “&” to represent con- 
junction of subgoals in rule bodies. Also, as usual, we define the implication (4 -S 1+9) 
to be equivalent to 4 v l$. 
If all attributes in a complex O-term S of the form ?“[ ] are omitted, we can iden- 
tify S with its object id, the id-term T. This allows us to view id-terms as a special 
case of complex O-terms. However, to avoid syntactic confusion with predicates 
(introduced later), we will allow to drop “[ 1” only in O-terms that appear in a 
“value’‘-position in another complex O-term (e.g., Ti and Sj, k in (3) above). We will 
thus write bob[uge + 30, father + bill] instead of bob[uge -+ 30[ 1, father + 
bill[ I]. It is also convenient to allow combinations of typing and complex 
O-terms. For instance. we could define 
Q: p[funA --,X: q[setA --H { Y}], setA + (2 : r}] 
as a syntactic sugar for 
Q: p A Q[funA + X[setA -H {Y}], setA + {Z}] A X: q A Z : r. 
Formulas that are “sugared” in this way will be used throughout this paper, 
especially in the examples. 
2.2. Semantics 
Given a language L of O-logic, a semantic structure, Z, is a tuple (V, I,, I,, I,, 
I,,<,). Here U is a nonempty (possibly infinite) universe of all objects; the 
’ This flexibility, required by the object-oriented syntax, is the primary reason for choosing the name 
“term” for statements, such as O-terms, which will actually play the role of formulas in O-logic. Another 
reason is that, as we shall see shortly, id-terms can be. viewed as a special case of complex O-terms. 
Our terminology in this respect is consistent with Maier’s [43] and with other works in this field. 
* These formulas are called “molecular” because, on one hand, they serve as building blocks for other 
O-formulas but, on the other hand, they are not really atomic. As we shall see later, a molecule may 
be equivalent to a conjunction of simpler O-terms. 
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mapping Z, interprets every k-ary object constructor f E F as a total function 
IF(f): lJk + U. When k = 0, IF can be viewed as a mapping from the constants of 
L into U. 
The mapping I, interprets each single-valued attribute funA E A _ as a partial 
function Z,(funA): U+ U. Similarly, I++ maps every set-valued attribute 
setAEA, into a partial function Z,(setA): U -+ 2”, where 2 denotes the power- 
set of U. The mapping Z, interprets each class-name in 2 as a subset of U, that is, 
Z,: JY + 2”. Finally, Gz is a transitive and reflexive relation (a pre-order) on ,E such 
that if p&q then Z,(p)cZ,(q) ( i.e., dz models the subclass relationship). 
As in the classic predicate calculus, a semantic structure should be viewed as a 
possible world that gives an interpretation to the alphabet symbols and formulas of 
L. For instance, the elements of U play the role of “real” objects in the possible 
world Z. In contrast, the elements of F* (the set of all variable-free id-terms) are the 
denotations or “names” given (via I,) to some of these objects. A semantic struc- 
ture, Z, interprets the typing O-terms and complex O-terms as assertions about 
properties of the named objects in U. Intuitively, an O-term t is satisfied by a 
semantic structure Z, if the properties asserted in t hold for the object of U referred 
to by the oid part of t. Thus, if no attribute is explicitly listed in a complex O-term 
(e.g., a[ 1) then this O-term is satisfied in every structure. The formal development, 
below, generally follows the terminology of [22], adapted to O-logic. 
A variable-assignment, v, is a mapping V + U. We extend it to id-terms in the 
usual way: v(f( . . . . T, . ..)) = Zr(f)( . . . . v(T), . ..) (if f is 0-ary then we have v(f) = 
I&)). For convenience, we also extend v to complex O-terms so that v(T[...]) is 
defined as v(T). 
Given a semantic structure Z and a variable assignment v, we can talk about 
formulas satisfied by Z with respect to v. Formally, formula satisfaction, denoted 
Z k y 4, is defined as 
l For a typing O-term 4 = T : p, Z l= y $ if and only if v(T) E Z,(p). 
l For an is-a O-term 4 = p : q, Z k y 4 if and only if p -cz. q. 
. For a complex O-term 4 = T[ . . . . funAi -+ Ti, . . . . setAj ++ {S,, . . . . S,}, . ..I., 
Z l==y 4 if and only if the following conditions hold: 
- For each functional attribute fhAi, Z,(finAi)(v(T)) = V(Ti) and 
Zkv Ti. 
- For each set-valued attribute setAj, {V(Sl), . ..) v(S,)} c 
Z,(setAj)(v( T)) and Z k y Sk, for each k = 1, . . . . m. 
Observe that the semantics of set-valued attributes is defined in such a way that if, 
say, Z j=” t[setA --H {a,, . . . . a,}] then Z k, t[setA -H {a,,, . . . . a,}], for every 
subset {a,,, . . . . ai,} E (a,, . . . . ak}. In particular, Z ky t[setA + { }] holds. 
However, in general, Z does not need to satisfy t[setA -H { }], since Z-(MA) is 
a partial function and thus it may be undefined on v(t). 
We also remark that Z k y p : q implies Z,(p) E Z,(q). However, the latter does not 
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imply the former. The definitions were set up this way because if Z,(p) c Z=(q) were 
entailing Z k y p : q then O-logic would not have had a complete proof theory. 
Indeed, it is easy to show that if Z,(p) c Z,(q) were implying Z by p : q then the so 
called query containment problem (known to be co-recursively enumerable [48]) 
could then be reduced to the question of whether some set of O-formulas logically 
implies p : q. We also note that, according to our semantics, an object may belong 
to no class, as UPS= z p) Z ( does not have to be equal to U. 
For O-formulae 4 and +, the meaning of 4 A +, 4 v $, and 14 is defined in the 
usual way. The meaning of a quantified O-formula is also standard: Z ‘F y $, where 
$ = (VX)# (resp., 1(/ = (3X)4) if for every (resp., some) ZJ that agrees with v 
everywhere except possibly X, Z ‘F ~ 4. Clearly, if 4 is a closed O-formula (no free 
variables), its meaning is independent of a variable assignment, and we can write 
Z b 4, omitting v. A semantic structure Z is a model of 4 if Z + 4, in which case we 
say that Z satisfies 4. 
2.3. Predicates as “Value-Based” Objects 
It has been argued (e.g., [4, 16, 311) that in certain cases it may be advantageous 
to have predicates on a par with objects. A typical situation where this might be 
needed arises when one has to assert certain symmetric relationships among objects 
(e.g., equality, adjacency, etc.). Although, as we shall see, any such relationship can 
always be encoded as an object, this may not be the most natural way to go. In this 
section, we first show how predicates can be encoded as O-terms and then present 
a direct semantics that does not appeal to this encoding. 
First-order predicates can be mapped into O-logic as follows: If p(T,, . . . . T,) is 
an atomic formula in predicate calculus, then the corresponding O-term is f,( T, , . . . . 
TJ : pC@rg, -+ T,, . . . . arg, + T,], wheref, is a new function symbol and p is a new 
class name; both f, and p uniquely correspond to p and are specifically chosen for 
this particular encoding. Note that every ground fact of the form p(t,, . . . . t,) 
corresponds to a unique object with the id f&r,, . . . . t,), which makes the above O- 
term a “valued-based” construct in the sense of [52] (i.e., this object’s identity is 
totally dependent on the values of the attributes). 
The mapping between atomic formulas of the first-order predicate calculus and 
O-terms described above allows us to use object identities, complex ejects, and 
predicates in the same framework. However, we prefer to forego the mental exercise 
of encoding predicates as objects, and show how predicates can be incorporated 
into O-logic directly. 
First, we extend the alphabet with a set of predicate symbols, ZZ, that is disjoint 
from F, A,, A,, z, and V. The language is then enriched with a new kind of 
molecular formulae, predicate ferms (abbr. P-terms), which are statements of the 
form p( T,, . . . . Tk), where p is a k-ary predicate symbol and the Tts are complex O- 
terms. The notion of O-formula is now extended appropriately to include P-terms, 
Note that by extrapolating the syntactic tradition of object-oriented languages, we 
introduced P-terms in a slightly more general form than it is customary for atomic 
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formulas in predicate calculus. For instance, likes(mary, john[salary + 99K]) is a 
syntactically correct predicate term. 
As mentioned in Section 2.1, to guard against the possibility of syntactic confu- 
sion between predicates and id-terms, we do not allow dropping the brackets “[ 1” 
in complex O-terms of the form t[ 1, when these appear as molecular formulas. 
However, writing mary[likes +fatZzer(john)] instead of mary[likes +father(john[ ]] 
is permitted (and, in fact, encouraged), because here father(john) cannot be 
confused with a P-term, since the latter cannot occur inside an O-term. 
The semantics of O-logic is extended to accommodate P-terms in an obvious 
way: Semantic structures now have the form Z= (U, IF, I_, I,, I,, &-, Z,), 
where U, Z,, I,, I,, Z,,and dz are as before and In interprets each k-ary 
predicate symbol p E Zi’ by a relation Z,(p) s Uk. Satisfaction of P-terms is defined 
as follows: Given a semantic structure Z and a variable assignment v, 
l z k”P(T,, ..., Tk) if and only if (v(T,), . . . . ~(7’~)) EZ~(P) and Z k-Y T,. 
As usual, the equality predicate “=” gets special treatment: 
l zn(=)~f{(U,U)~UEU}, 
which is equivalent to saying that for any pair of id-terms, T and S, 
9 Zh=,(T=S) if and only if v(T)=v(S). 
The reader can easily verify that this semantics coincides with the one that results 
from the encoding introduced earlier; it is also consistent with the usual semantics 
of atomic formulas in predicate calculus. 
3. DATABASES AND QUERIES 
A deductive database (or a logic program-we will use these two terms inter- 
changeably) is a set of closed O-formulae. If P is a set of O-formulae and Q is an 
O-formula, we write P k 4 if and only if 4 is true in every model of P. In this case, 
we also say that 4 is logically implied (or entailed) by P. 
Given an O-logic language L, let V be the set of variables in the alphabet of L 
and let F be the set of object constructors. A substitution is a mapping 0: V + (id- 
terms of L} that is an identity everywhere outside a finite set dam(a) c V, called the 
domain of e. Any substitution can be extended to id-terms by letting it commute 
with constructors, as usual. Substitutions are further extended to O-terms and 
quantifier-free O-formulae by letting them commute with logical connectives and 
defining a(T[ . . . . funAi --) Ti, . . . . setAj -H {S,, . . . . &} ,... ])=a(T)[ . . . . funAi+ 
a( Ti), ..*, setAj --H {C@,), . . . . a(S,)}, . ..I. 
If 4 is a quantifier-free O-formula and 0 is a substitution, the formula ~$4) is an 
instance of 4. A formula or a term is ground if it has no variables. A,substitution 
o is ground if for each X~dom(a), a(X) is a ground id-term. For any pair of 
substitutions 8 and p, 0 0 p denotes their composition, that is, 8 0 p(X) = 0( p(X)). 
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A query is a statement of the form ?- Q, where Q is an O-term. Given a database 
P, the set of unwers to ?- Q  is the smallest set of ground O-terms, that is, 
(1) closed under “l=” and 
(2) contains all instances of Q  logically entailed by P. 
The first condition here is a mere technicality, motivated by the fact that in O-logic 
sets of O-terms may imply other O-terms in a non-trivial way. For instance, in the 
absence of this condition, the query 
?-john[children ++ (X)] 
to the database consisting of 
john [children -H (sally, bob > ] 
would have had the answer john [ children + {sally} ] and john [ children -H (bob} 1, 
but not john[children +-+ (sally, bob}]. Condition (1) helps eliminate this anomaly. 
Unlike the original Maier’s proposal, extensional databases are not identical to 
semantic structures in our formalism. For us, an extensional database is a finite set 
of O-terms and P-terms (not necessarily ground, if one so wishes). However, in 
Section 6 we shall see that every extensional database P can be associated with a 
certain “canonic” semantic structure that satisfies every molecule in P. 
Horn rules are defined in the standard way, as implicitly universally quantified 
statements of the form t -Z T, & . . . & z,, where z and the zi)s are positive O-terms 
or P-terms. For instance, the rule M [works + D] -z D : dept[mngr + M  : empl] 
states that department managers work in the departments they manage. Here dept 
and empl are classes and M, D are object variables. Universal quantifiers over M  
and D are omitted. 
4. EXAMPLES 
In this section, all logic programs consist of Horn clauses only and therefore the 
logical implication “k” of Section 2.2 is quite adequate for understanding the 
examples below. An O-logic adaptation of the classic theory of logic programs is 
outlined in Section 10. 
4.1. A Warm-up 
We start by casting a simple relational database into the object-oriented syntax 
of O-logic. We remind that according to Section 2.3, every relational database is 
also a syntactically correct O-logic extensional database. The next example, 
however, shows a different representation for a familiar problem-one that is in line 
with the object-oriented paradigm. Whether one likes the relational syntax or the 
object-oriented one, both representations are within the realm of O-logic. 
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EXAMPLE 4.1. The common Employee-Department-Manager example has the 
following object-oriented look: 
john : empl[ works -+ cs : dept, name + “john” : string] 
cs : dept[mngr +jh : empl, name + “a” : string, budget + 1000 : int] 
ee : dept[name -P “eel’ : string, budget -+ 1000 : int]. 
Here, i&n, cs, and ee are constants denoting real-world objects (presumably, some- 
one called John and some concrete computer science and electrical engineering 
departments). Likewise, the constants ‘john, ” “ee,” and “cs” denote abstract objects 
that are strings of characters; in our example, these strings happen to be the values 
of the name-attribute in the context of the objectsjohn, ee, and cs, respectively. The 
above O-terms also classify j&n as an instance of the class empl, cs and ee as 
instances of dept, “jojohn, ” “CS” as instances of the class string, and 1000 as an int. By 
the way, 1000 is a constant symbol denoting an abstract object, the number 
“Thousand.” 
In O-logic, objects that are indistinguishable via the values of their attributes can 
be distinguished by their identities. Explicit manipulation with object ids gives us 
added flexibility in writing queries. The next example shows how this enables 
explicit control over elimination of duplicates. Depending on whether or not 
duplicates’ elimination is desirable, the query asking for a list of all budgets can be 
written either as 
no-duplicates( Y)[budget + Y] -G= X : dept[nume + 2 : string, budget + Y : int], 
or as 
duplicates-welcome(X)[budget --, Y] 
<= X : dept[nume -+ Z : string, budget + Y : int], 
where no-duplicates and duplicates-welcome are some unary function symbols. In 
the first case, the identity of newly created objects depends on budget only. Thus, 
duplicate tuples containing the same numerical values of the budget are eliminated, 
since they correspond to the same object. In contrast, the second rule retains 
duplicates, since the id here depends on the department rather than the budget. 
4.2. The Problem of Existential Variables 
Let us now turn to the issue of anomalies exhibited by the logic originally 
proposed in [43]. 
EXAMPLE 4.2. Consider a slightly simplified version of the “interesting pair” 
example from [ 43 ] : 
P[emp + E, mngr + M] t 
E : empl[nume -+ N : string, (1) 
works + D : dept[mngr + A4 : empl[nume + N]]]. 
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This rule is supposed to construct objects representing pairs employee-manager 
such that the employee’s department’s manager’s name coincides with the 
employee’s name. 
As observed in [43], universal quantification over the object-variable P does not 
make sense in this example. It was then suggested that P should be quantified 
existentially. More precisely, Maier suggested the following quantification for the 
above rule: (VE VM VN 3P). 
Unfortunately, the argument in [43] is not well substantiated, and the reasons 
for the choice of this particular quantification are not quite clear. In fact, we claim 
that the intended quantification here is (VE VA4 3P VN) and Maier’s quantification 
happens to work only because E and M  functionally determine N. Should the 
attribute name be set-valued, the two quantifications would have different 
meanings. 
There seems to be no obvious way of choosing between the above two quantifica- 
tions solely on the basis of the syntactic structure of rule (1). The root of the 
problem is that the object variable P does not appear in the body of (l), leaving 
the quantification of P open to debates. Since [43] did not have object construc- 
tors, Maier’s original logic had no way of connecting P to object variables in the 
body of (l), which led to the aforesaid ad hoc choice of quantification. A better 
representation for the problem at hand would be: 
namesake(E, M) [emp --f E, mngr + M] + 
E : empl[name + N : string, 
works -+ D : dept[mngr + A4 : empl[name + N]]], 
(2) 
where namesake is an object constructor. Unlike (l), the semantics of (2) is well 
defined and corresponds to the intended meaning. 
The constructor namesake can be viewed as a Skolem function arising from the 
quantification (VE VM 3P VN) mentioned earlier. The explicit use of object 
constructors in our version of O-logic is a way of disambiguating the quantification. 
EXAMPLE 4.3. Consider a graph stored as a set of objects of the form 
E : edge[start --* X : node, end + Y : node]. The set of (not necessarily simple) paths 
between nodes in the graph can be specified via the following rules: 
E : path -z= E : edge[start -+ X : node, end + Y : node] 
add(E, P) : path[start -+ X, end + Y] -S 
E : edge[start + X : node, end -+ Z : node] (3) 
& P : path[start --, Z  : node, end + Y : node]. 
The first clause simply says that every edge is also a path. The second clause says 
that adding an edge adjacent to a path creates another, longer path. Thus, given 
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a query ? - P : path[start --) X : node, end-, Y : node], the set of answers will be 
composed of O-terms of the form add(e,, add(e,, . ..e....))[start + a, end+ b], 
where the ej’s are the object id’s of edges and a, b are object id’s of nodes. Here, for 
any path, its object id reconstructs the way this particular path has been built and 
provides a useful information in its own right. The answer-set to the above query 
will have an object for every path connecting every pair of nodes. Since non-simple 
paths are allowed, the answer to this query may be an infinite set of objects. 
Should one be interested in the reachability relation between nodes rather than 
the all-paths problem, the corresponding set of rules will be 
reuch(X, Y) : path[sturt + X, end -+ Y] -c= 
E : edge [ slurt --) X : node, end + Y : node] 
reuch(X, Y) : path[sturt -+ A’, end -+ Y] -c= 
E : edge[sturt --) X : node, end -+ 2 : node] 
&P:path[sturr-+Z:node,end-+ Y:node]. 
(4) 
Here ids of the objects being constructed solely depend on the start and the end 
points of the respective paths. The set of answers to the aforementioned query will 
then be comprised of O-terms of the form reuch(u, b)[sturt + a, end + b]. Conse- 
quently, the answer will contain exactly one object for each pair of nodes connected 
by a path. 
It should be noted that (3) constructs all paths, including the non-simple ones 
and, therefore, an infinite number of them. If this is a bother, we could modify the 
second rule in (3) as follows: 
udd(E, P) : pathcsturt -+ X, end -+ Y] F simple(udd(E, P)) 
& E : edge[sturt + X : node, end + Z : node] 
& P : path[sturt + Z : node, end --) Y : node], 
where simple(...) is a predicate that checks whether the id-term udd(E, P) represents 
a simple path. Because of the structure of the ids in (3), simple(.. .) can be easily 
defined in Prolog with negation (and hence in O-logic). 
Example 4.3 not only demonstrates the flexibility of our logic, but also 
emphasizes once again the inadequacy of rule quantification suggested in [43]. 
Indeed, according to Maier’s original proposal the second rule in (3) and (4) would 
have to be written as 
Path : path[sturt + X, end + Y] c; 
E : edge[sturt + X : node, end + Z : node] 
& P : path[sturr + Z : node, end + Y : node], 
(5) 
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where Path is a new object variable. The last rule in (3) can be obtained from (5) 
by interpreting a&(. . .) as a function that results from a Skolemization of Path with 
respect to the quantification (VE VP 3Path VX VY VZ), while the last rule in (4) is 
obtained from (5) by Skolemizing Path with respect to (VA’ VY 3Path VE VP VZ). 
However, there is nothing in the structure of the rule (5) that helps choose one 
quantification over the other. Beeri, Nasr, and Tsur [14, 151 espouse a view similar 
to that of [43], proposing another ad hoc choice of quantification. Our contention 
is that no single such decision regarding quantification should be hard-wired into 
the logic; instead, we contend that a variety of different quantifications should be 
expressible in a single formalism. 
4.3. Set-Grouping 
The next series of examples demonstrates our concept of grouping, compared to 
LDL. Example 4.4 uses grouping to express set-intersection and set-union operators 
(the latter is a built-in function in LDL). Unlike LDL, grouping in O-logic behaves 
monotonically and does not require stratification. For instance, the following 
O-logic program has a unique m inimal model, provided that the domain and the 
interpretation of function symbols are fixed (e.g., as in Herbrand interpretations). 
EXAMPLE 4.4. Set-intersection and union can be expressed as follows: 
inter(S,, S,) : set[elements + { }] -= S, : set[elements + ( }] 
& S2 : set[eZements --b-b ( }] 
inter(S,, S,)[elements +b {X}] -z=S, : set[elements + {X}] 
82 S2 : set[elements -b+ {X}] 
union(S,, S,) : set[elements ++ { >] cr S, : set[elements --t) { }] 
& S2 : set[elements --H { }] 
(6) 
union(S,, S,)[elements ++ {X}] -=S, : set[elements -++ {X}] 
& S2 : set[elements -b-9 { >] 
union(S,, &)[elements -+b {X}] -z= S, : set[elements ++ { }] 
& S2 : set[elements -++ {X}]. 
(7) 
Expressions of the form elements --H (X> in the rule heads are examples of set- 
grouping in O-logic. The first clause in (6) says that if the elements attribute in both 
S, and S2 is defined (and hence its value is a set that at least contains the empty 
set) then elements is also defined for the object inter(S,, S,) that represents the 
intersection of sets represented via objects S1 and S,. 
The second rule in (6) tells us that if A’ is an element of the set S,.elements 
(which here denotes the value of the attribute elements in the context of the object 
Si) and, at the same time, it is a member of S,.elements then X also belongs to the 
set inter(S,, &).elements. In other words, if INTER consists of the intersection- 
rules (6) plus some extensional database (e.g., a : set [elements -H (c, d } ] and 
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b : set[elements --H {d, e>]) then for any pair of set-objectsfand g and any h,, . . . . 
h, E F*, 
INTER k inter(f, g)[eZements + {h,, . . . . h,}] if and only if 
INTER kf[elements + {h,, . . . . h,}] A g[elements --H {h,, . . . . h,}], (8) 
which means that inter(f, g) represents the intersection of sets represented by the 
objects f and g. Another way to say this is that in every model Z of INTER, the set 
Z+(e~ement~)(Zd~nter)(l,(f ), Z,(g))) contains the intersection of the sets 
Z+,(eZements)(Z,(f )) and Z,(e/ements)(Z,(g)) and for some interpretations this 
containment turns into equality. 
To see why (8) is a valid claim, consider an arbitrary model I= (U, I,, I_, I+,, 
I,, &, In) of INTEGER. The first rule in (6) guarantees that if Z,(elements) is 
defined on a pair of elements U, u E U then it is also defined on Z,(inter)(u, 0). It is 
now seen from the definitions that for the second rule to be true, the following must 
hold in I: 
Z++(eZements)(Z,(inter)(u, 0)) 2 Z,(eZements)(u) n Z,(eZements)(v). 
This shows the “if” part of (8). For the “only if’ direction, suppose that, say, 
INTER # f[eZements --H {q}], for some qEF *. It is then easy to construct an 
interpretation J such that J k inter(J g)[eZements -H {q)]. 
It is worth noting the essential role of the first rule in (6): If only the second rule 
in (6) were used to define the intersection, then the definition would have been 
correct only for intersecting non-empty sets, since X must be bound to something 
in order for the rule to fire. This also explains why it takes three rules in (7) to 
define set-union. Although having to deal with empty sets separately is a nuisance, 
the problem can be easily circumvented via a simple syntactic sugar. Intuitively, 
what we need here is a new kind of variable that can be found to “nothing” so that 
the same O-term could represent empty as well as non-empty sets. To this end, we 
can introduce new kinds of variables that are, say, prefixed with a “?“-symbol and 
then restrict their occurrence to set-constructs only (i.e., to the inside of the braces 
“{ }“). Every clause C containing a “?“-variable, e.g., ?X, is semantically equivalent 
to a pair of clauses, C1 and C2, where C, is the same as C except that ?X is 
replaced by a new ordinary variable (e.g., Xz13), and C, is obtained from C by 
deleting ?X altogether. This transformation must be subsequently performed for 
every “?“-variable. Semantically, these variables can be accommodated by changing 
the definition of variable assignments, v : V + U, letting them be undefined on some 
or all of the “?“-marked variables. Filling in simple details of this semantics is left 
to the reader. With this new notation, set-union can be defined in just one rule: 
union(S,, S,) : set[eZements -9-b {?X, ?Y}] t S, : set[eZements -b-b {TX}] 
& S2 : set[eZements --H {?Y}]. 
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The next pair of examples compares our concept of grouping to that of 
LDL [ 133 and COL [2]-the two recent languages that model sets using a second- 
order semantics. The following program from [ 133 does not have a unique m inimal 
model in LDL, while the O-logic prgram with a similar reading does. Here, a model 
Z  of a set of formulas S is called minimal if and only if for every other model .Z of 
S, whenever Z  k 4 for a molecule 4 then also .Z + 4. 
EXAMPLE 4.5. Consider the following database written in the LDL notation: 
P(<W) :-cm 
q(2), 
where “( )” is the grouping operator of LDL. Intuitively, this rule should be read 
as follotis: Collect all elements of q, group them into a set, make this set into an 
element of the universe, and let p be true of this element. One would thus expect 
the answer to the query ?-p(Y) be p( (2)). H owever, because of the second-order 
semantics, the notion of model-minimization in LDL is such that this program may 
have several m inimal models and therefore p( (2)) is not considered as an answer 
according to the m inimal-model semantics. 
To circumvent this problem, LDL introduces the concept of “model dominance” 
on top of the notion of m inimality, which significantly complicates the matters. 
In O-logic, the mere notion of m inimality suffices to handle the problem correctly. 
The corresponding O-logic program is: 
a:p[group+ {x}]~Y:q[arg-+x] 
b :q[arg-r2] 
and the answer to the query ?- Y: p[group ++ {Z}] is a[group + (2}], as 
intended. 
Our next example shows that COL is somewhat restrictive since it cannot handle 
certain simple situations that are perfectly legal in O-logic. 
EXAMPLE 4.6. The following database in the COL syntax [2] depicts persons 
and their hobbies: 
person( peter, {bridge} ) 
per.son( tom, {chess, tennis} ). 
Suppose that, in addition, it is known that every hobby of Peter is also a hobby 
of Tom: 
person( tom, hobby(peter)) 
person( tom, hobby(rom)), 
where hobby is a data-function defined in COL as follows: 
YE hobby(X) :-person(X, Z) & YE Z. 
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Intuitively, the intention here is that person(tom, (bridge, chess, tennis}) should be 
true. Rather surprisingly, this COL program turns out to be nonstratified (not even 
locally stratified) and therefore it has no meaning. Again, the problem can be traced 
to the second-order semantics of COL. In O-logic the corresponding representation 
is simpler and has a unique minimal Herbrand model (Herbrand models are 
introduced in Section 7): 
peter : person[hobby -++ {bridge}] 
tom : person[hobby -++ {chess, tennis}] 
tom[hobby --H {A’}] -=peter[hobby ++ {X)]. 
The first pair of clauses here describes the objects peter and tom. The last rule says 
that every hobby of peter is also a hobby of tom. Let HOBBY denote the above 
O-logic program. Following the line of reasoning of Example 4.4, the reader can 
verify that for every ground term t, HOBBY /= peterchobby -t+ {t}] implies 
HOBBY b tom[hobby -++ {t)], as intended. 
Observe that in Example 4.6, X does not have to be a “‘?-variable, since there 
is no need to treat empty sets separately: if peter has no hobbies, the hobby- 
attribute may well be undefined for tom, which is perfectly acceptable for the 
problem at hand. However, it will not be a mistake if X is replaced by a “?“- 
variable, say ?Y. The difference is that in the latter case, whenever hobby is defined 
for peter (even if peter has an empty set of hobbies), the hobby-attribute must be 
defined for tom (again, even though tom may have no hobbies to speak of). 
Although the distinction between undehnedness of a set-valued attribute and one 
having an empty set as a value may seem insignificant, this allows us to talk about 
“meaningless” attributes, that is, attributes that are inapplicable to certain objects. 
This idea is further explored in [34]. 
4.4. Inheritance 
The following example demonstrates certain (admittedly limited) capabilities for 
modeling inheritance. A more’elaborate treatment appears in [34]. 
EXAMPLE 4.7. Consider the following database: 
john : workstudy 
workstudy : student 
workstudy : employee 
X[duty ++ {homework} ] t X : student 
Y[ duty -++ ( officework } ] -c= Y : employee. 
Here, the rules define duties assigned to different types of people. All students have 
a homework duty and all employees have an officework duty. Since workstudy is a 
subclass of student and employee, john inherits properties of each of these classes. 
In particular, john[duty -W {homework, officework}] logically follows from the 
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database. Indeed, it is easy to verify that john : student and john : employee both 
follow from the first three clauses. Therefore, to satisfy the two rules of the 
database, every semantic structure must satisfy john[&ty + (homework, 
officework}]. 
5. EQUALITY AND INCONSISTENCY 
In knowledge bases, it is important to be able to say that a pair of different 
object-denotations, e.g., futher(john) and peter, refer to essentially the same thing. 
In O-logic, this can be represented via an equation futher( john) =pefer. 
EXAMPLE 5.1. Suppose the database D is: 
john : person 
peter : person 
futher( john) = peter 
futher(X)[chifdren -H {X}] -S X : person. 
The last clause says that every person X belongs to the set of children off&her(X). 
It is easy to see that futher( john)[chifdren + { john}] logically follows from D. 
The equality futher( john) =peter means that peter and father( john) denote the 
same object. Thus, given a query ?-peter[children +-+ {Z>] (“who are Peter’s 
children?“), the answer is Z=john. 
As in predicate calculus, along with the added expressibility, equations introduce 
a number of computational difficulties. Classic logic programming sidesteps these 
difficulties by prohibiting equations to appear in the rule heads. This essentially 
amounts to building a theory around the so-called freeness axioms for equality, 
which state that two terms are equal if and only if the terms are syntactically identi- 
cal. However, in O-logic, equality is omnipresent; it sneaks in even when it is not 
mentioned explicitly. Indeed, functional attributes are interpreted as partial func- 
tions from objects to objects and so whenever a functional attribute is multiply 
defined on the same object, an equation ensues. For instance, if obj[uttr + f ] and 
obj[uttr + g] are both in P, then f = g is logically entailed (check!). However, if 
also P k (f # g) holds, then P has no model and inconsistency arises. 
The potential for inconsistency pointed out above is rather unpleasant, for it 
means that one may be doing extensive computation just to find out that the 
database has a flaw and therefore all the answers produced so far make no sense. 
There are several different ways to handle this problem. In the earlier version of O- 
logic [31], a special constant T was reserved to represent inconsistency, and when- 
ever something like obj[uttr + f] and obj[uttr +g] were derived, the O-term 
obj[uttr +T] was logically entailed. The important property of this semantics was 
that such inconsistency only affected this particular attribute, uttr, and had no effect 
on other “good” attributes. This allowed us to localize the effect of inconsistency 
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and provided sound model-theoretic foundations for the resulting computation. 
Unfortunately, the way inconsistency-tolerance was handled in [3 1 ] was not quite 
satisfactory, since it relied on the freeness axioms for equality and thus limited 
the domain of applicability of O-logic by ruling out statements such as 
father(john) =peter. 
In the end, we opted for a different semantics for functional attributes, the one 
given in Section 2.2. Nevertheless, inconsistency-tolerant functional attributes can 
be introduced in the following simple way: Let A _ be a new type of functional 
attributes, inconsistency-tolerant, whose semantics is similar to that of set-valued 
attributes, except that they obey the following pair of axiom chemata: For every 
attr E A _ , 
T[attr -T] e T[attr -+ X] & T[attr -+ Y] & X# Y 
T[attr -+ X] e T[attr r* T]. 
(9) 
Here, attr n) . . . is a new piece of syntax that is used to distinguish inconsistency- 
tolerant functional attributes from the rest. The symbol “T” is a distinguished con- 
stant in the alphabet of the language that represents inconsistent attribute values. 
The first axiom above says that if attr has two different values in the context of the 
same object then the value of this attribute should be declared as inconsistent (for 
this particular object). The second axiom says that if the value of an attribute is 
inconsistent then the attribute has aN values at once. Semantically, attributes in A _ 
can be accommodated by augmenting every semantic structure, Z= ( U, I,, I,, 
Z -7 z.z, 62 In), with an additional mapping, I, , that interprets every incon- 
sistency-tolerant attribute attr E A _ as a partial function Z ^ t (attr): U--f 2 “. This 
mapping has the following properties: For every u E U for which I, (attr)(u) is 
defined, 
(1) Z,(attr)(u) is either a singleton set (o}, for some DE U, or 
I, (attr)(u) = U; and 
(2) if Z,(T) E I, (attr)(u) then I, (attr)(u) = U. 
With this semantics, if john[salary -+ 99K, age - 403 and john[age + SO] both 
hold true and 40f50 is known, then john [ salary -+ 99K, age -+ T] and 
john[age cf 1201 logically follow, while john[salary --v 80K] does not, unless salary 
becomes inconsistent (for a different reason). Whether or not the information 
about John’s salary is inconsistent, can be tested by asking the query 
?-john[salary -T]. Of course, since the logical entailment “l=” is only semi- 
decidable (Section 9.6), evaluation of this query may not terminate in the lucky case 
when John’s salary is consistent. 
The difference between the inconsistency-tolerant attributes in [31] and the 
present version is that now the freeness axioms are not built into the semantics. 
Rather, we can have an arbitrary equation theory, EQ, and derive inequality using, 
say, Reiter’s closed world assumption (CWA), that is, by postulating that 
EQ b(t#s) if EQ /# (t=s). Here “b” denotes logical implication relatively to 
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CWA; it will be further discussed in Section 10.3. In our example, closed world 
assumption sanctions the derivation of the inequality 40 # 50, provided that the 
programmer-supplied equational theory does not insist that 40 = 50.3 
The above semantics for the attributes in A _ is monotonic in the sense that the 
addition of new facts and rules to the database does not invalidate the information 
that was there originally. In particular, this semantics does not preclude conclusions 
drawn from inconsistent data. For instance, in the above example, ifjohn[uge ‘Y T] 
were derived and the database had a rule john[category -+ “senior”] -c= 
johncage -+ 801 then the rule would still fire, yielding the conclusion that john is a 
senior citizen. In [33, 351, the notion of epidemic entailment was introduced, which 
guards against derivations of this sort. Epistemic entailment can be adapted to 
O-logic, but this issue is beyond the main focus of the present paper and will not 
be discussed here. 
6. DISCUSSON 
At this point it is instructive to make several observations regarding the differen- 
ces between our version of O-logic and Maier’s original work. One of the main 
distinctions is that object constructors are explicitly part of our language. This 
seemingly minor difference is responsible for the elimination of most of the 
problems that plagued [43]. 
Among the less significant differences is the fact that we do not distinguish 
between so-called atomic data values and other objects. For us, each atomic value 
(e.g., a numeral) is both an object and its own object id. Furthermore, unlike [43], 
we do not find it useful to restrict the semantics so that atomic objects will have 
no internal states (in [43], attributes are undefined on atomic objects). In contrast, 
in our setting, atomic values may have properties (e.g., 3[diuisibility +prime, 
type + int], ‘yohn”[type + string, length + 4]), just like LISP atoms do. Our choice 
is based on the observation that Maier’s restriction on atomic objects is not essen- 
tial, and we are not at all sure that atomicity is a useful notion in this context. 
Our treatment of sets is another important extension of [43]. The interesting 
comparison here is with the treatment of sets in LDL [13], COL [2], and 
ELPS [39]. LDL is an ambitious attempt to introduce sets into logic programs in 
a clean way. Unfortunately, LDL turned out to be far too expressive than what one 
may hope to be able to compute. As shown in [13], the following program is 
tantamount to the famous set-theoretic paradox: 
P(X) 
P((X))+-P(X). 
According to the semantics of LDL, p would have to contain the set of all sets as 
an element, which causes the paradox. The possibility of paradoxes in LDL stems 
3 Of course, in a real programming language, integers will come with a built-in theory of equality, so 
that it will not be possible to say that 40 = 50. 
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from its untyped second-order semantics in which variables may range over sets as 
well as individuals; “untyped” means that in the course of a computation the Same 
variable may become bound to sets as well as individuals. In contrast, the semantics 
of O-logic is first order4 and variables cannot range over sets. Sets in the semantic 
domain can be indirectly represented via object ids, but are not explicitly present 
here. In [18] it is shown that first-order semantics not only precludes paradoxes, 
but also makes sets computationally more tractable. 
Sets in O-logic are flat in the sense that a set may contain only object ids as 
members, but not other sets. However, since any id may represent some other set, 
we are able to model sets of arbitrary nesting depth. We contend that this represen- 
tation is essentially all one needs to have for computing with sets. Moreover, 
representing sets via ids has certain computational advantages, since in most cases 
one only needs to verify that, say, two sets are intentionally equal, that is, have 
equal ids. In this situation, LDL and other related identity-less formalisms will 
require a proof that the definitions of the two sets always yield the same extension, 
which is not even recursively enumerable. 
At the other end of the spectrum, COL and ELPS take a conscious decision to 
exclude infinite sets from consideration. Although this restriction helps to avoid 
many of the semantic problems of LDL, it is somewhat artificial and limits the 
expressiveness of these languages. For instance, even though a set might be infinite, 
we still may want to reason about it by manipulation with its object id (which is 
what mathematicians often do). It also makes perfect sense to check if certain ele- 
ment is a member of a potentially infinite set. In COL and ELPS, such programs 
do not even have a meaning. Furthermore, for any sufficiently expressive language 
(e.g., Horn clauses with function symbols) the question of whether a set defined by 
a set of rules is finite, is undecidable (e.g., [48]) and thus-even for Horn 
clauses-the user cannot be sure whether his program makes any sense to a system 
that outlaws infinite sets. We believe that in O-logic a better balance is struck 
between expressiveness and computability: unlike COL and ELPS, O-logic allows 
(albeit indirectly) arbitrarily deeply nested and infinite sets, but the semantic 
problems of LDL do not arise. In addition, the second-order semantics of LDL, 
COL, and ELPS heavily taxes these languages by requiring stratification with 
respect to their grouping mechanisms, even when programs are Horn. 
Our notion of a complex object is more flexible, too (cf. Cl, 281). It is usually 
assumed that complex objects are constructed by means of tuple and set construc- 
tors. However, O-terms combine the two constructs in one, creating a new kind of 
object. For instance, children(john)[futher +john, kids - {bill, mury}] is struc- 
turally different from john[nume -P “John,” kids -+ children(john)[kids - {bill, 
mury}]]. The latter can be obtained by first applying the set constructor and then 
the tuple constructor, while no such sequence of operations can yield the former 
O-term. Indeed, the second component of the former O-term (namely {bill, mury)) 
is not an O-term by itself (it has no associated id), and therefore cannot be 
4 See [ 18, 201 for more discussion on the higher-order vs Ii&-order semantics. 
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constructed independently from the object children(john). This corresponds to weak 
entities in the entity-relationship model. 
Finally, we note that O-terms can denote cyclic objects, although this feature is 
not new and can be found in other formalisms (e.g., [S, 14, 381). However, it 
should be noted that in [38] cyclic objects cannot be constructed by a query, since 
LDM bans cyclic queries. We do not know if such objects can be constructed in 
[ 143, but they certainly can be in O-logic, e.g., X[self+ X] G= X. 
7. RELATIONSHIP TO PREDICATE CALCULUS 
We have seen that ordinary predicate calculus is a proper subset of O-logic. The 
following result shows that, nevertheless, no additional expressive power has been 
gained: 
THEOREM 7.1. Let L be an O-logic language. Then there is a language L’ of the 
first-order predicate calculus and a pair of transformations 
@  : O-logic formulas in L --) Predicate-calculus well-formed formulas in L’ 
Y’: O-logic semantic structures for L + Predicate-calculus semantic structures 
for L’ 
such that for every O-formula 4 and semantic structure I for L, I k 0 4 if and only 
if WI  FPPC@(~). H ere “kO” denotes the logical entailment relation of Section 2.2 
and L&k pC” is the logical entailment relation of classical predicate calculus. 
Proof Let the alphabet of L consist of F, A,, A,, C, II, V, connectives, quan- 
tifiers, etc. The corresponding language L’ for predicate calculus has the same set 
of variables V, connectives, quantifiers, and other paraphernalia. The set F’ of func- 
tion symbols in L’ consists of F  and Z. The elements of C are viewed as constants 
in L’, while the elements of F  retain the arity they had in L. The set I7’ of predicate 
symbols in L’ contains the sets Z7, A,, A,, and a triple of new predicates: 
“object, ” “instance,” and “subclass.” Arities of the members of l7’ that come from l7 
are the same as they were in L; object is a unary predicate and the rest of the 
predicates are binary. 
The mapping 0 transforms every typing O-term T : c into instance (T, c) and every 
is=a O-term p : q into subclass (p, q). Q, leaves P-terms essentially intact, except in 
the case when a P-term contains complex O-terms inside. More precisely, 
P( T, , . . . . T,) is transformed into p( T,, . . . . T,) A @ (T,) A . .. A @ ( Tk), where Ti is 
the id-term representing the object id of Tj (i.e., T,= Ti [...I), i= 1, . . . . k. 
A complex O-term T[ . . . . funA + R, . . . . set,4 -++ {S,, . . . . S,}, . ..I is transformed by 
@  into ... A funA(T, R) A Q(R) A ... A  set&T, 3,) A @(,!?,) A  ..- A  setA(T, ,?,) A 
@(s,) A  . . . . where R and Si, i= 1 , . . . . 1, are the terms occurring in the object id 
position of the complex O-terms R and Si, respectively. Complex O-terms of the 
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form T[ ] are transformed into a tautology, e.g., true. We also need one Horn rule 
per functional attribute to express the functionality property and two rules 
to express transitivity of the is-a and typing O-terms. Finally, quantifiers are 
relativized as follows: 3x4 is converted into X(object(X) A 4) and VXd into 
VX(object(X) -+ 4). 
The mapping Y is defined in an obvious way: Let I= (U, I,, I,, I,, Zz, <=, 
?A’ (U’ 
be a semantic structure for L. The corresponding semantic structure Y(Z) = 
7 I’ I’ ) is such that: F’, 17’ 
l U’ 2’ Uu2 (a disjoint union); 
l The interpretation of function symbols IIF, is defined as follows: 
For each f~ F, IF(f) = IF(f) over the arguments in U; r,,(f) is defined 
arbitrarily if at least one of its arguments is in U’- U. For every p E C, I;,(p) is 
defined to be p. 
9 rnp, the interpretation of the symbols in Z7’, coincides with In on the 
elements of n; on the rest of the symbols in 17’, the mapping I’,, is defined as 
follows: 
- &(object) zf U; 
- Z~.(instance) 22 {(u, p) I uEl,(p)}; 
- I&(subcluss) zf {(p, q) I p Gz q}; 
- I&(funA) gf {(u, u) 1 o=l,(funA)(u)}, for each funAEA,; 
- I’,,(setA) 2’ {(u, u) 1 u E Z,(setA)(u)}, for each setA E A,. 
The rest of the claims are verified by direct inspection. 1 
Informally, Theorem 7.1 can be interpreted as a statement that O-logic is essen- 
tially a syntactic variant of a relational (i.e., predicate-calculus-based) language. 
This suggests that the tug of war between relational and object-oriented languages 
does not have such deep theoretical underpinning as some people thought it does. 
8. SKOLEMIZATION, HERBRAND INTERPRETATIONS AND HERBRAND'S THEOREM 
8.1. Skolem Theorem 
Skolemization in O-logic is similar to its counterpart in the classical predicate 
calculus, since id-terms are essentially identical to terms in predicate calculus and 
quantification is defined similarly in both cases. For instance, (VX VY 32) 
Y[attr, +Z, attr, -t Y] can .be Skolemized to (VX VY) Y[attr, -f(X, Y), 
attr, 3 Y], where f is a new binary function symbol. We therefore have an 
analogue of the Skolem theorem, whose proof is an easy adaptation from predicate 
calculus. 
LOGICFORPROGRAMMING 99 
THEOREM 8.1 (cf. Skolem theorem). Let 4 be an O-formula and qY be its 
Skolemization. Then 4 is unsatisfiable if and only if so is 4’. 
As in predicate calculus, the Skolem theorem leads to the notion of a clause. 
First, we can transform any O-formula into its prenex normal form. Then, by 
Skolemizing existential variables we can eliminate all existential quantifiers. Since 
all the remaining quantifiers are universal, we can drop them altogether. Finally, by 
transforming the formula into its conjunctive normal form, we end up with a set of 
disjunctions of P-literals and 0-literals that is unsatisfiable if and only if the 
original O-formula was unsatisfiable. Each such (implicitly universally quantified) 
disjunction is called a clause. 
8.2. Herbrand Interpretations 
As we have seen, O-terms may be embedded in other O-terms to an arbitrary 
depth. However, a special kind of P-terms and O-terms, called flat, is most com- 
mon. A flat O-term is either a typing O-term, an is-a O-term, or a complex O-term 
of the form T[ . . . . fid, + Ti, . . . . setAj -++ {...Si k... >, . ..I. where all the terms Ti, Sj, k 
inside the brackets and braces are id-terms. A flat P-term is a P-term of the form 
P(R 1, ..., R,), where each Ri is an id-term. It is easy to see that every P-term and 
O-term is equivalent to a conjunction of flat terms. For instance, 
john[works -+ toys[mngr + gene], child - { jack[age + 31, mary[age + 4]>] 
is equivalent to 
john[works + toys, child -W {jack, mary } ] A toys[mngr -+ gene] 
A jack[age + 31 A mary[age + 43. 
Restricting attention to flat O-terms can greatly simplify the notation used in the 
O-logic proof theory and, except for the examples, flat O-terms are assumed until 
the end of this paper. 
Given an O-logic language L with a set of constructors F, its Herbrand unioerse 
is F*-the set of ground id-terms. The Herbrand base, denoted HB(L), is the set 
of all ground O-logic molecules in the language L (including O-terms, equality, 
typing, is-a, and P-terms). 
A Herbrand interpretation is a subset of the Herbrand base that is closed under 
the logical entailment “k .” The closedness requirement is a matter of convenience; 
it is adopted because ground molecules may imply other molecules in a nontrivial 
way, e.g., {a[funA + b], a[funA +c]} + (b=c) or {p:q, q:r} l= p:r. This is 
reminiscent of the situation in predicate calculus with equality, where the condition 
is that the equations in any Herbrand interpretation must form a congruence 
relation. 
It is easy to verify that any Herbrand interpretation H for a language L satisfies 
the following closure properties: 
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(1) Equality atoms in H define a congruence relation: 
Rej7exiuity. For all terms p in F*, (p =p) E H. 
Symmetry. If (p = q) E H, then (q =p) E H. 
Transitivity. If (p = q, q = r } E H, then (p = r) E H. 
Substitutiuity. If molecules s = t and L are in H and L’ is the result of 
replacing one occurrence of s in L by t, then L’ is also in H. Here, L can 
be either an O-term or a P-term. 
(2) For is-a and typing O-terms, the following holds: 
Reflexivity. p : p E H, for each p E C. 
Transitivity.A{t:q,q:r}cH,thent:rEH,forany tEF*andq,rEC.If 
{p:q, q:r)cH, then p:rEH, for any p, q, rcC. 
(3) For every ground id-term t, t[ ] is in H. 
(4) For complex O-terms. If t[funA +r,], t[funA +r,] EH, then 
(rl = r2) E H. 
(5) For every O-term t, t is in H if and only if every constituent atom of t is 
in H. 
The constituent atoms mentioned in (5) are defined as follows: 
. Every typing O-term, T: p, or an is-a O-term, q : p, is its own constituent 
atom. 
l For a flat complex O-term R = T[ . . . . funAi -+ Vi, . . . . setAi + (Sj, 1, . . . . 
Sj,k}, . ..I. its constituent atoms are: T[funA, + V,], T[setAi * { }], 
T[setAj + {Sj, ,}I, . . . . T[setAi --tt {S, k > 1, for each functional attribute funA i and 
each set-valued attribute setAi occurring in R. 
l Every flat P-term is its own constituent atom. 
LEMMA 8.1. A molecule R is satisfied by a semantic structure I and a variable 
assignment p if and only if so is every atom of R. 
Proof Immediately follows from the definitions. m 
Formula satisfaction in Herbrand interpretations is now defined as follows: 
l For a ground molecule A, H k A (resp., H /= 1 A) if and only if A E H 
(resp., A $ H). 
l For a ground clause C z L, v . . . v L,, H k C if and only if H k L, for 
some 1 <i<n. 
l For a non-ground clause, H k C if and only if H k C’ for all ground 
instances c’ of C. 
For a set of clauses S, if every clause in S is true with respect to H, then we say 
that H is a Herbrand model of S. 
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8.3. Reduction to Herbrand Interpretations 
There is a natural correspondence between Herbrand interpretations and 
semantic structures. Given a semantic structure Z, the Herbrand interpretation H, 
corresponding to I is simply the set of all ground molecules that are true in I. 
Conversely, for a Herbrand interpretation H over the Herbrand universe F*, its 
corresponding semantic structure, IH= (U, I,, I,, I,, I,, dz, In>, is defined as 
follows: 
(1) U sf F*/ = ; that is, U is the quotient of F* induced by the equations in 
H. The equivalence class of t is denoted by [t]. 
(2) IF(t) = [t], for every 0-ary symbol t E F. 
(3) IF(f)(Ctll> . ..> Chl) = Lot17 . ..Y ta)], for every k-ary (k>, 1) function 
symbol f in F. 
(4) Z..+(funA)( [t]) = [s], if t[funA + s] E H; undefined, otherwise. 
(5) Z,(setA)([t]) = ([s] I t[setA ++ (s}] E H}, if t[setA -++ ( }] E H; 
undefined, otherwise. 
(6) Z,(P)= {[Is1 I s: PEH). 
(7) Z,(p)= {([tl] ,..., [t,]) ( p(tl ,..., t,,)EH}, for each n-ary predicate 
PEl7. 
(8) G={(p>q) IP:vW 
We remark that if in (5) t[setA ++ { }] 4 H then there is no s such that 
t[setA ++ {s}] E H and so Z,(setA)([tJ) is undefined. In contrast, when 
t[setA ++ { }] E H then I,(setA)([t]) is defined, but this set may still be empty 
if there is no s such that t[setd --H {s}] E H. 
It is easy to see that I, = (U, I,, I,, I,, I,, <=, In) defined above is indeed 
a semantic structure. The next proposition establishes a connection between general 
and Herbrand models in O-logic. 
PROPOSITION 8.1. Let S be Q set of clauses. Then I k S if and only $ H, k S. In 
particular, S is unsatisfiable if and only if S has no Herbrand model. 
Proof. “Only-if.” It suffices to show that if S has a Herbrand model H, then the 
corresponding semantic structure, I,,, is a model of S. First we claim that for an 
atom T of any molecule, if H k r then I,, l= z. Suppose, for definiteness, that 
T = t[funA + s] (the cases of typing and is-a O-terms as well as those of set-valued 
attributes and P-terms are similar). Suppose H /= r. Then, by the definition of I,, 
I,(funA)( [t]) = [s]. Hence, ZH k r. 
By Lemma 8.1, a semantic structure satisfies a ground molecule if and only if it 
satisfies every atom of that molecule. It follows from the above that H /= t implies 
ZH + t for ground molecules. This result extends to arbitrary clauses and sets of 
clauses by structural induction. Therefore, since H + S, we have ZH /= S. 
“If.” Assume that S has a model I. We will show that its corresponding Herbrand 
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intrepretation, H,, is a Herbrand model for S. By definition, H, consists of ground 
molecules that are true in I. So, for any ground molecule CI, if Z k c1 then H, /= cr. 
Again, by structural induction, this result extends to arbitrary clauses and the sets 
thereof. 1 
8.4. Herbrand’s Theorem 
In the first-order predicate calculus, a set S of clauses is unsatisfiable if and only 
if.so is some finite subset of ground instances of clauses in S. This statement is 
usually referred to as Herbrand’s theorem. 
It is easily seen from the construction in Theorem 7.1 that, given an O-logic Her- 
brand interpretation H, its predicate calculus counterpart, Q(H), is a Herbrand 
interpretation for G(S). Furthermore, from the closure properties for Herbrand 
interpretations (Section 8.2) it follows that @ is a surjective mapping from the 
set of O-logic Herbrand models of S onto the set of Herbrand models of D(S). The 
O-logic analogue of Herbrand’s theorem now follows from these observations and 
from the Herbrand’s theorem in predicate calculus. 
THEOREM 8.2 (cf. Herbrand’s theorem). A clause set S is unsatisfiable fand only 
if so is some finite subset of ground instances of clauses in S. 
Herbrand’s theorem is a basis for resolution-based sound and complete proof 
theories in predicate calculus [17]. The next section presents one such theory for 
O-logic. 
9. PROOF THEORY 
9.1. Ordering and Merging of O-terms 
We can define a pre-order, <, on (possibly nonground) O-terms as follows. Let 
T, and T2 be a pair of O-terms or P-terms. We say that T, is a subterm of T,, 
denoted T, < T2, if and only if every atom of T, is also an atom of T,. For 
instance, T[attr + {X}] < T[attr + {X, Y}], but T[attr ++ {Z}] is not a 
subterm of T[attr ++ {X, Y >I. 
In case of complex O-terms, T, < T, intuitively means that for the same object 
obj, T, asserts fewer properties of obj than T2 does. In cases of is-a and typing 
O-terms or P-terms, T, < T, simply means that T, and T2 are identical. The 
following lemma presents a semantic characterization of this ordering: 
LEMMA 9.1. Let T be a flat O-term or a P-term. Then for every semantic 
structure Z and every variable assignment v, Z k y T if and only if for every subterm 
T’of T,Zk=.T’. 
Proof: Directly follows from the definition of “k.” m 
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Given a pair of complex O-terms T1 and Tz with the same id, their merge is a 
complex O-term S such that the set of all atoms of S equals the union of the sets 
of atoms of T, and T2. Merge of a pair of terms may not be unique. For instance, 
T[funA + c, set,4 ++ {u} ] and T[funA -+ d, setA -H {b} ] have two merges: 
T[jiinA + c, funA -+d, setA -~{a}, setA ++ {b}] and T[funA + c, funA +d, 
setA ++ (a, b)]. However, we distinguish the canonical merge, which is unique. 
A merge of T, and T2 is canonical, denoted merge( T, , T2), if and only if it has 
no repeated occurrences of the same set-valued attribute (repeated functional 
attributes are allowed). For the above example, the second of the merges is canoni- 
cal, while the first one is not. It is easy to see that merge(T,, T,) is unique up to 
a permutation of atoms and of id-terms in the ranges of set-valued attributes. The 
following is a consequence of Lemma 9.1. 
COROLLARY 9.1. Z  + y merge( T, , T,) if and only if I + y T, and Z k y T2. 
9.2. Unification 
For id-terms and flat P-terms, unification is defined in the same way as in 
predicate calculus: Let T1 and Tz be a pair of id-terms or P-terms. A substitution 
D is called a unifier of T, and T2, if and only if rr( T,) = a( T2). 
A pair of typing O-terms, T : p and S : q, unifies if the id-terms T and S unify and 
p is identical to q. Is-a O-terms unify if they are identical. 
Unification of complex O-terms is defined somewhat differently: Rather than 
requiring terms to be identical after applying the substitution, we merely ask that 
one term will be a subterm of the other. Let T, and T, be a pair of complex 
O-terms. A substitution o is a unifier of T, into Tz (note the asymmetry!) if and 
only if C( T,) < a( TJ. 
A unifier (r of T, and T, (T, into T,, in case of complex O-terms) is most general 
(abbreviated mgu) if for every other unifier p of T, and/into Tz such that 0 = y 0 p 
for some substitution y, there is a substitution 6 such that p = Joa. Here, yap and 
6 0 B are functional compositions, e.g., y 0 p(t) = y(p(t)). This definition of mgu 
coincides with the classical one, except that it uses a different notion of unifier, 
defined above. 
For id-terms, is-a or typing O-terms, and for P-terms, mgu is always unique up 
to an equivalence and the above definition is tantamount to the standard one. 
However, for complex O-terms there may be several (but a finite number of) mgu’s. 
For example, there are two mgu’s (namely, (X/u) and (X/b)) of u[setA + {X}] 
into u[setd + (a, b)]. Th ere ore, f resolving away a pair of such O-terms may yield 
several different resolvents, which differs from the situation in predicate calculus. 
This multitude of resolvents is an inevitable consequence of the presence of set- 
valued attributes in O-logic. In related theories that deal with sets as first-class 
citizens, multiple mgu’s are common when sets are to be unified (e.g., [ 13, 391). 
In O-logic, the role of the unique mgu of the classic predicate calculus is taken 
over by the notion of a complete set of mgu’s. Given a pair of O-terms P and Q, 
we say that a set Sz of mgu’s of P into Q is complete, if and only if for every 
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substitution 8, such that B(P) < 0(Q), there exists c E Q, such that 0 = y o g, for some 
substitution y. It follows from the definition that, given a pair of O-terms, any two 
complete sets of mgu’s are identical up to an equivalence.’ To preserve continuity 
of the presentation, we postpone the description of an algorithm for finding a 
complete set of mgu’s until Appendix A. 
9.3 inference Rules 
The existence of some proof theory for O-logic follows from Theorem 7.1. 
However, translating O-terms into predicate calculus is not a good way to do 
business since most of the “computational hints” embedded in the structure of 
O-terms are lost in this translation. The proof theory presented next operates 
directly on O-terms and takes their structure into account. 
Our deductive system for O-logic consists of the reflexivity axioms for equality 
and is-a O-terms and of several inference rules: resolution, factoring, paramodufu- 
tion, merging, functionality, elimination, and transitivity. All these rules assume that 
the clauses are standardized apart, that is, variables are renamed so that when a rule 
is applied to a pair of clauses, the clauses do not share common variables. However, 
standardization does not preclude rules from being applied to pairs of instances of 
the same clause and even-in case of ground rules-to pairs of identical copies 
of the same clause. .Also, to simplify the language, we will sometimes talk about 
unifying a P-term (resp., typing or is-a O-terms) into another P-term (resp., typing 
or is-a O-terms), even though unification in this case is symmetric. 
REFLEXIVITY AXIOMS. ( 1) (VX) X= X. 
(2) p:p, for every pE.Z. 
The main workhorse in our deduction system is the resolution rule, which is an 
adaptation from predicate calculus. The resolution rule seeks to resolve a negative 
literal in one clause with a positive literal in another clause. 
Resolution. Consider a pair of (not necessarily ground) O-logic clauses 
C gf 1 P v C, and C’ zf Q v C2 with no common variables and suppose that there 
is an mgu 8 of P into Q. Then 
d(Cl) v @C*) (10) 
is a binary resolvent of C and C’. Note that the resolution rule is asymmetric when 
the literals involved in the operation are complex O-terms. 
It is well known from predicate calculus that binary resolution does not suffice, 
and one also needs factoring and paramodulation rules. 
Fuctoring. Let C gf T v T’ v C’ (resp., 1 T v 1 T’ v C’) be a clause, such that 
T is unifiable into T’ with the mgu 8. Then 0( T v C’) (resp., 0( 1 T’ v C’)) is called 
5 Sets of unifiers Q, and Q, are equivalent if (1) for each o1 E a, there is g2 E R, and substitutions y, 
6 such that u,=you, and u,=~ou,; and (2) for each c2 ES~, there is u, ER, with the properties 
symmetric to those described in (1). 
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a factor of C. Observe the difference between the positive and the negative cases of 
factoring: in the positive case, the “smaller” term T remains in the factor, while in 
the negative case it is the larger term, T’, that survives. 
Paramodulation. Let C%‘L[T]vC, and c’~‘(R=S)vC2 be a pair of 
clauses with no common variables, where L[T] is a literal containing an id-term 
T. If T and R are unifiable id-terms with the mgu 0, then 
wx~l) v ec11 v QG) (11) 
is a paramodulant of C and C’. Here, L[S] denotes L with one occurrence of T 
replaced by S. Paramodulation applies to O-terms as well as P-terms. 
Unlike predicate calculus, resolution, factoring, and paramodulation do not 
suffice for a complete proof procedure. Consider the following pair of O-terms: 
a[funA -+ b, setA -W {c}] and a[funA -+ d, setA --t) (e}]. Clearly, a[funA + b, 
funA --) d, setA -W {c, e}] is logically entailed by these terms, but this entailment 
cannot be proved using the rules introduced so far. In addition, the functional 
attributefunA in the above O-terms has two distinct values, b and d, for the same 
object a. Since functional attributes are interpreted as single-valued functions, it 
follows that b = d must hold. To account for these situations, we introduce the 
merging and the functionality rules. 
Merging. Let C zf P v C, and C’ 2’ Q v C2 be a pair of clauses with no 
variables in common, such that P and Q are positive complex O-terms. If the ids 
of P and Q are unifiable with the mgu 8, then the clause 
mew(QP), e(Q)) v e(C,) v e(G) (12) 
is called a merge of C and C’ (merge(. . ., . . ,) was introduced in Section 9.1). 
Functionality. Let C ‘%’ T,[ . . . . funA -+ R,, . ..] v C1 and c’ 2 T2[ . . . . funA + 
R2, . ..] v C2 be a pair of clauses that share no variables. If T, and T2 are unifiable 
with the mgu 8, then the functional derivative of C and C’ is the clause 
e(R, = R2) V o(q) V o(c2). (13) 
Still, all of the above inference rules do not form a complete proof theory. For 
instance, all degenerated O-terms of the form T[ ] (no attributes specified) are 
O-logic tautologies and yet they cannot be refuted using the rules given so far. Such 
b-terms are taken care of by the following elimination rule: 
Elimination. Let 1 T[ ] v C be a clause. Its eliminant is the clause C. Note here 
that if C is empty, the elimination rule derives an empty clause q , that is, 0 is the 
eliminant of the clause -I T[ 1. 
To complete the picture, we need a rule that accounts for the transitivity of the 
is-a relationship. 
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Transitiuity. Let T: q be a typing O-term and q : r be an is-a O-term, respec- 
tively. Their composition is the typing O-term T: r. For a pair of is-a O-terms p : q 
and q : r, their composition is p : r. The transitivity rule is a rule that sanctions 
derivation of such compositions. More precisely, the transitivity rule derives 
p:rvC,vC, from p:qvC, and q:rvC,; from T:qvC, and q:rvC, it 
derives T: r v C, v Cz. 
Given a set S of clauses, a deduction of a clause C from S, denoted S t- C, is a 
finite sequence of clauses D,, . . . . D, such that D, = C and, for 1 < k en, 
. D,ES, or 
l Dk is a reflexivity axiom, or 
4 Dk is derived from D,, . . . . D,- , via one of the above derivation rules. 
A refutation of S is a deduction of the empty clause, Cl, from S. 
9.4. Adjustments for Inconsistency-Tolerant Attributes 
Inconsistency-tolerant attributes can be incorporated into the proof theory in two 
ways. The simplest one is to add the axioms (9) of Section 5 for every such 
attribute. The first of these axioms corresponds to the reduction rule in [31] and 
does not introduce new problems. The second axiom in (9) may result in a very 
inefficient computation, though. Instead of using this latter axiom, a better way 
would be to slightly change the definition of “unification into” in Section 9.2, which 
in turn will have implications for the resolution and factoring rules (since these are 
the only rules where this notion is used). However, no new inference rule will be 
needed. 
In fact, we are only going to change the definition of the notion of a constituent 
atom of Section 8.2 so that the set of constituent atoms of the term T[..., attr nt T, . ..] 
will contain (among the rest) all the O-terms of the form T[attr -+ S], for every 
id-term S. 
This change in the definition affects the notion of a subterm, since now 
T[attr -+ S] < T[attr ry T] (as every atom of the left-hand O-term is also an atom 
of the right-hand O-term). The implication for the resolution is that now 
T[attr -+ T] v C can be resolved with 1 T[attr -+ S] v C’, yielding C v C’. For the 
factoring rule, the new definition implies that T[attr -+ S] v T[attr -+ T] v C can 
be factored into T[attr c, S] v C and 1 T[attr c+ S] v -I T[attr -T] v C into 
1 T[attr -+ T] v C. 
9.5. Soundness of the Proof Theory 
THEOREM 9.1 (Soundness of O-logic deduction). Zf S t C then S k C. 
ProojI It suflices to show that each of the aforementioned axioms and deriva- 
tion rules is sound. As an example, we will establish soundness of the merging rule. 
Let M be a model for P v C, and Q v C2. We need to show that merge(d(P), 
0(Q)) v e(C,) v 19(c,) is true in A4, where 8 is a mgu of the ids of P and Q. 
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If either 0(C,) or G(C,) is true in M , then we are done. Otherwise, M  k 0(P) 
and M  i= O(Q). Since these O-terms have the same id, their merge exists. By 
Corollary 9.1, M  b merge(t)(P), e(Q)). 1 
EXAMPLE 9.1. Consider again the database of Example 4.7: 
(a) workstudy : student 
(b) workstudy : employee 
(c) john : workstudy 
(d) X[&y --++ (homework}] -Z X : student 
(e) Y[duty -++ {officework}] cz Y: employee. 
Let the query be 
(f) ?-john[duty --H {X}]. 
Refutation of (f) can be done as follows. By transitivity of is-a O-terms, we derive 
(g) john : student 
(h) john : employee 
from (a), (b), and (c). Resolving (g) with (d) and (h) with (e) yields 
(i) john [ duty --H {homework} ] 
(j) john[duty ++ (officework}]. 
Note that the O-term (i) and (j) have the same id, and hence can be merged: 
(k) j&[&y --H {h omework, officework}]. 
Finally, resolving (k) with the query (f) yields the empty clause. The complete set 
of mgu’s here has just two elements: (X/homework) and (X/officework). Thus, the 
answer to (f) is john[duty -H {homework, officework}]. 
9.6. Completeness of the Ground Deduction 
Before proving completeness, we need the following auxiliary lemma: 
LEMMA 9.2. Let S be a set of ground O-logic literals. If S is unsatisfiable then 
there are molecules P and Q, such that P < Q, -I P E S, and S k Q. 
Proof. Suppose to the contrary, that there are no molecules P and Q, such that 
P 6 Q, 1 P E S, and S l- Q. We will show that then S is satisfiable. 
Consider a subset of the Herbrand base: D(S) Ef (P E HB(L) I, where P is a sub- 
term of a molecule deducible from S}. We claim that D(S) is closed under the logical 
entailment “+” and thus is a Herbrand interpretation. 
In Section 8.3, we have shown that for any Herbrand interpretation H there is 
a semantic structure In such that H l= S if and only if ZH k S. Applying the same 
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construction to D(S) we get a semantic structure MDcs,. This construction goes 
through and M,(s, is indeed a semantic structure because D(S) is closed under “t” 
and hence possesses the closure properties of Section 8.2. To show that D(S) is also 
closed under “h,” we will prove that for any molecule P, 
KNS, I= p zf and only zf PE D(S). (14) 
Soundness of the derivation rules provides for the “if” direction. For the “only-if” 
direction, consider the following cases: 
(1) P is a P-term or an is-a/typing O-term. Depending on the type of P, cases 
(7), (8), or (6) in the construction of Section 8.3 can be used to show (14). 
(2) P is a complex O-term composed of the atoms c~z, . . . . a,. Clearly, 
M,(,, k P if and only if M,+., b ai, i= 1, . . . . n. Again, using cases (4) or (5) of 
Section 8.3 (depending on whether the attribute in ai is functional or set-valued) we 
can show that M,(s) k uj if and only if aj E D(S). Therefore, by the definition of 
D(S), there are terms Q,, . . . . Qn deducible from S such that each aj is a subterm of 
Qj. Therefore, every atom of P is also an atom of Q = merge(Q,, . . . . Qn) and thus 
P is a subterm of Q. But Q is deducible from D(S) since so is each of the Qi. Hence, 
by the definition of D(S), it follows that P E D(S), which proves (14). 
Now, if P E S is a positive literal then P E D(S); hence D(S) /= P. By the assumption 
at the beginning of the proof, for every negative literal 1 P in S, P is not a subterm 
of any molecule in D(S). So, D(S) j= 1P (as D(S) is a Herbrand interpretation). 
Thus, D(S) satisfies every literal in S, that is, D(S) is a model for S. 1 
THEOREM 9.2 (Completeness of the ground deduction). Zf a set of ground 
clauses S is unsatisfiable then S k Cl, where 0 denotes the empty clause. 
Proof By Herbrand’s theorem (Theorem 8.2), if S is unsatisfiable, then there 
exists a finite subset T of S, such that T is unsatisfiable. We will show that T t- 0 
using a technique from [6]. The proof is carried out by induction on the number 
of excess literals in T, denoted excess(T), where 
excess(T) 2’ (the number of occurrences of Ziterals in T) 
- (the number of clauses in T). 
Basis. excess(T) = 0. Then the number of clauses in T equals the number of 
literalsin T. Therefore, every clause in T consists of either a positive or a negative 
literal. Since T is unsatisfiable, by Lemma 9.2, there is a negative literal -I P in T, 
and a positive literal Q deducible from T, such that P< Q. Then, by first deriving 
Q from T and resolving 1 P with Q, we can obtain the empty clause. 
Induction step. excess(T) = n > 0. In this case, there must be a clause C in T that 
contains more than one literal. Let T = (C} u T’ and C = L v C’ (C’ is not 0 since 
we have assumed that C contains more than one literal). By the distributivity law, 
LOGIC FOR PROGRAMMING 109 
{L v C’} UT’ is unsatisfiable if and only if Tr = (L} UT’ and T2= {C’} u T’ are 
unsatisfiable. Since excess(T,) < n and excess(T2) < n, by the inductive hypothesis, 
Tr t 0 and T2 10. Observe that if T2 k Cl, then by applying to T the deduction 
sequence that produces Cl from TZ, we can derive either L or 0. If Cl is so 
produced, then we are done. Otherwise, L is produced. Using the same deduction 
sequence that derived 0 from T, , we can derive 0 from T u {L}. Combining the 
two deductions yields a refutation of T. 1 
9.7. Lifting the Ground Deduction 
To prove completeness of non-ground deduction, we first establish an O-logic 
analogue of the lifting lemma [17]. It is shown in Appendix A that for every pair 
of nonground O-terms, there is a finite complete set of mgu’s. Alas, the size of this 
set may be exponential, which is inevitable in the presence of sets. However, the 
next proposition and the comments in Section 9.8 show that the complexity of set- 
unification is polynomial in some important special cases, such as logic programs. 
PROPOSITION 9.1. Let P, Q be possibly nonground O-terms with the same id. 
There is an algorithm that finds a complete set, C?, of mgu’s of P into Q. IR is finite, 
but in the worst case it may be exponential in the size of P and Q. However: 
(a) Q has only one element, if P, Q are P-terms or typing/is-a O-terms, or if 
Q is a complex O-term without repeated occurrences of the same attribute and with 
only singleton sets; 
(b) The size of 12 is polynomial in the size of Q, if P is a complex O-term 
whose number of set-valued attributes and the size of its sets is bounded by a global 
constant that is independent of the size of Q. 
Proof: See Lemma Al and the discussion in Appendix A. 1 
LEMMA 9.3 (Lifting lemma). Suppose A and B are clauses with no variables in 
common, and let A’, B’ be some instances of A and B, respectively. If C’ is derived 
from A’ and B’ using one of the inference rules of Section 9.3, then applying the same 
rule to some factor.? A and I? of A and B, respectively, yields a clause c such that 
c’ is an instance of 2‘. 
Proof. The proofs for all inference rules are pretty much similar; we will only 
consider a slightly more involved case of the resolution rule. 
Suppose A’ and B’ can be resolved with a mgu p. Without loss of generality, we 
assume that there is a negative literal 1 P’ in A’ and a positive literal Q’ in B’, such 
that p(P’) 6 p(Q’). We also assume that A’ and B’ (resp., A and B) do not share 
variables. Since A’ and B’ are instances of A and B (and variables are not shared), 
there is a substitution 13, such that A’ = 8(A) and B’ = B(B). Let 1 P,, . . . . 1 Pk be 
all the literals in A that are mapped by 0 into 1 P’, and let Q,, . . . . Q, be all the 
6 As in predicate calculus, this is the only place where the factoring rule comes into picture. 
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literals in B that are mapped into Q’. Let A (resp., B) be a factor of A (resp., B) 
that splices the Pi’s (resp., the Qi’s) together into the term P (resp., 0). Thus, there 
is a substitution rl such that P’= B(P,) = v(P) and Q’= O(Q1) = q(Q). Since 
p~O(P1)=p(P’)<p(Q’)=poB(Ql), it follows that 
Therefore, p o q is a unifier of P into Q. Let Q be a complete set of unifiers of P into 
&. By the definition of complete sets of mgu’s, there is a mgu r~ E Sz such that p 0 q = 
yo c, for some y. Thus, using c as the mgu, we can resolve d and B to obtain c. 
It is straightforward to verify that c’ is an instance of c. 1 
THEOREM 9.3 (Completeness of O-logic deduction). If a set S of clauses is 
unsatisfiable, then there is a refutation from S. 
Proof It is easy to see that S is unsatisfiable if and only if the set of all its 
ground instances S’ is unsatisfiable. By completeness of ground deduction 
(Theorem 9.2), there is a refutation from S’. Then, with the help of the lifting 
lemma, we can lift this ground refutation to a nonground refutation from S. 1 
9.8. Remarks qn the Proof Theory 
It is known that one of the major obstacles to an efficient implementation of logic 
formalisms that deal with sets is the complexity of set-unification. There is a major 
difference between set-unification in O-logic and that in LDL, COL, and ELPS 
[2, 13, 391. For a pair of sets of id-terms S and S’, unification in O-logic finds the 
most general substitution CJ such that a(S) E a(S). This is known as the “first-order 
subsumption problem” [24] and is NP-hard. In comparison, the corresponding 
unification problem for LDL, COL, and ELPS requires strict equality: 
o(S) = o(S’). Although both problems have equally bad worst-case complexity, the 
subsumption problem seems easier, at least conceptually. In the rest of this sub- 
section we will argue that O-logic has computational advantages in the important 
case of logic programs. 
The proposed solution to set-unification in LDL is to rewrite programs at 
compile-time, replacing set-unification by an exponential number of rules that are 
free of set-terms [49]. 
In O-logic, we have two options. Since there are simple algorithms for set- 
subsumption, we can use them directly. For instance, it is generally accepted that 
the size of each individual rule in any logic program P is small compared to the size 
of facts and the number of rules in P. Therefore, we can assume that sizes of O- 
terms in rule-bodies are globally bounded by a small constant. Since body-literals 
are unified into the head-literals (head-literals include the fact-literals in the 
database), it follows from the discussion in Appendix A that the complexity of 
unification in O-logic is polynomial in the maximum of sizes of the head literals in 
P. Measuring complexity in this manner is akin to Vardi’s data complexity for 
queries [ 561. 
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Another way to do unification is to follow the lead of LDL and rewrite the rules 
at compile time. For instance, we can simplify literals in rule-bodies by splitting 
them into atoms. Clearly, this does not increase the number of clauses, while their 
sizes may increase only by a constant factor. Since unification of an atom A into 
O-term B is polynomial in the size of the O-term B (see Appendix A), performing 
every single resolution step in the transformed program is relatively inexpensive. 
A potentially expensive operation is factoring, since it involves unification of pairs 
of positive O-terms and the latter cannot be split into atoms without an exponential 
increase in the program size. Fortunately, factoring is not needed to evaluate logic 
programs, as in the classical case. 
We thus see that in O-logic it is possible to make unification a polynomial opera- 
tion by blowing up the program size by a constant factor, which stands in sharp 
contrast with LDL, where the program size may be blown up exponentially.’ 
The last remark in this subsection concerns the equality predicate. In classic logic 
programming, programs do not contain equality in rule-heads, and the so-called 
freeness axioms for equality [47] are assumed. Under the freenes axioms in O-logic, 
the paramodulation rule becomes redundant. The functionality rule can now be 
applied in conjunction with the merging rule in such a way that whenever a func- 
tional attribute is found to be multiply-defined, the empty clause will be derived. 
For instance, merging the terms r[ ,.., funA + ri, . ..] and T[ . . . . fun,4 + r2, . ..] in 
this way would yield inconsistency, provided that rl and r2 are ground and 
non-unifiable. Likewise, for inconsistency-tolerant attributes, T[attr -P r,] and 
T[attr -+ rz] would yield T[attr -+ T] here. 
10. A LOGIC PROGRAMMING SEMANTICS 
The semantics of O-logic (that is, the relation “k”) described so far is monotonic, 
which means that S k 4 implies S u S’ k 4, where S and S’ are sets of O-formulas 
and 4 is an O-formula. However, in databases and logic programming it is 
customary to supply only the true data, assuming (roughly) that a fact is false if its 
truth cannot be established. The reason for not specifying negative data explicitly 
is, among other things, that the size of such data is very large and often is even 
infinite. The semantics corresponding to this latter kind of reasoning is called non- 
monotonic. In the classic case, the nonmonotonic semantics of logic programs is 
built on top of the ordinary monotonic semantics of predicate calculus by restrict- 
ing the logical implication to certain subclasses of the class of all models, called 
intended or canonic models. Shoham [SO] showed that this principle underlies a 
large number of known nonmonotonic theories. 
In classic logic programming, a number of different semantics have been 
proposed (e.g., [3, 25, 37, 44, 551). Most of these semantics agree with each other 
‘It should be clear, however, that even though the size of O-logic programs does not undergo 
significant increase, the number of unification steps may well be exponential, as in LDL. 
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on the class of locally stratified programs. The semantics of such programs is based 
on so called perfect models and is described in [44]. In this section we show how 
this semantics can be adapted to O-logic. 
10.1. Minimal Models 
For a starter, we consider Horn-clause programs and define the notion of 
minimal models and the renowned TP operator. 
Let L be an O-logic language and 1, I’ be a pair of interpretations. We write 
I@” I’ if whenever Z k $ for some molecule $ then also I’ k $. For Herbrand 
interpretations, it follows from the definitions that I&” I’ if and only if I& I’. 
Given a set S of clauses, a model Z is minimal if and only if for any other model 
I’ of S, I’ $ min I implies Z 4 mi” I’. 
In general, a minimal model may not be unique, even in the Herbrand case. 
However, as in the classic case, when S contains only definite Horn clauses then 
there is a unique Herbrand model. The proof can be obtained either directly (along 
the lines of [42]) or by twiddling with Theorem 7.1. For Horn clauses, the minimal 
Herbrand model is considered to be the canonic one and the program semantics is 
defined relatively to this unique model. More precisely, the nonmonotonic entailment 
relation “tz( ” is introduced such that S b 4 if and only if M k 4, where M is the 
unique minimal model of S. 
A well-known result about minimal models of Horn programs is that they coin- 
cide with the least fixed point of the one-step-derivation operator T,. Similar result 
holds for O-logic: Let P be a set of (O-logic) Horn clauses and H be a Herbrand 
interpretation. Then, T,(H) is the smallest Herbrand interpretation that contains 
the following set of molecules: 
{p 1 p e body is a ground instance of a clause in P such that H l= body}. 
Such a smallest interpretation always exists; the reader can easily verify that inter- 
section of any number of Herbrand interpretations is closed under “l=” and thus, 
again, is a Herbrand interpretation. 
Iterations of TP are now defined as follows. Let I be the smallest Herbrand 
interpretation for L, that is, 1 contains only tautological O-terms, such as p : p, 
a = a, and t[ 1. Then 
T;= I; 
T “p’ ’ = TP( T”,); 
It is left to the reader to verify (either directly or with the use of Theorem 7.1) that 
T$ coincides with the unique minimal Herbrand model of P. 
We also mention that the standard query optimization techniques developed for 
deductive databases (e.g., [12, 21, 30, 571) can be applied to O-logic, again, not 
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surprisingly in view of Theorem 7.1. There are new twists to this problem, however, 
because O-logic programs contain more semantic information (such as functional 
attributes) than their classic counterparts. We will not discuss query optimization 
any further in this paper. 
10.2. Perfect Models 
When clauses have negation in the body then the minimal-model semantics is 
no longer adequate. An appropriate semantics based on stratification was first 
proposed in [7,54] and then generalized by Przymusinski in [44], who called it 
the perfect-model semantics. We now show how these ideas can be applied in the 
context of O-logic. The general principle (here and in other cases, such as stable- 
model and well-founded semantics) is that whenever predicates are used in the 
classic case, attributes should be used in O-logic. For instance, 
X[trusts -++ {Y)] * i X[suspects + { Y}] 
is stratified in O-logic, even though the object X recursively depends on itself 
through negation. On the other hand, 
X[beats + {Y}] *plays(X, Y) & i Y[beats 4+ {X}] 
is not stratified because of the negative recursion through the attribute beats. 
There is a difficulty, however, related to the use of equality. In [44], the perfect- 
model semantics was introduced under the assumption that equality is axiomatized 
by the freeness axioms, which say that two terms are equal if and only if they are 
identical. Without this assumption, the standard definitions may give counter- 
intuitive results. For instance, a direct and simple-minded application of the delini- 
tions in [44] to the program 
a=belp(b) 
would yield a unique perfect model {p(u), p(b), a = b >. The problem here is that 
p(b) is not supported by any rule and, in fact, the equation a= b (and thus also 
p(b)) was derived based on the assumption that p(b) is false! In the classic theory 
of logic programs, this anomaly is avoided by banning the equality predicate from 
rule-heads. However, this does not work well for O-logic because, as noted in 
Section 5, equality can be generated via functional attributes. Besides, we believe 
that being able to equate symbols is important for knowledge representation. For- 
tunately, the solution to this problem is simple: It suffices to preclude the equality 
atoms from being dependent negatively on other literals. 
Formally, given an O-logic language L and a program P, a dependency graph 
D,(P) is defined as follows: Let P* be the set of all ground instances of the rules 
in P. The nodes of D,(P) correspond to the ground atoms constructible in L. 
A possitive arc 4 $ $ is in D,(P) whenever P* has a rule $ -G= . . . & 6 & . . . . where $ 
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and I/ are constituent atoms of the molecules 4 and 5, respectively. A negative arc 
4 G Ic/ is in D,(P) whenever P* has a rule $ t . . . & 14 & . . . , Note that both 4 and 
e can be equations. In addition to the arcs listed above, D,(P) has the following 
positive arcs: whenever some complex atomic O-terms u[attr + 61 and a[attr + c] 
appear in the rule-heads in P*, we draw the arcs a[uttr + b] 2 (b = c) and 
u[uttr + c] -2 (b = c). 
A directed path or a cycle in D,(P) is negative if it contains at least one negative 
arc. A program P is locally stratified if: 
(1) D,(P) has no negative path leading into an equation-node; and 
(2) D,(P) has no negative cycles. 
A stratification is a function 
l level: {atoms of P*} -+ N 
such that if D,(P) has a directed path from 4 to + then level(+) < level($). If there 
is a negative such path then level($) < level($). 
The preference order on semantic (not necessarily Herbrand) structures is now 
introduced as follows: M is preferable to N, denoted Me”“” N, if whenever there 
is an atom 4 such that M b 4 and N /# 4 then there is an atom $ such that 
level(+) < level(#), N k cc/, and M k $. Models that are minimal with respect to 
“$prfr’ are called perfect. The following result can be proved either directly (along 
the lines of [44]) or with the help of Theorem 7.1: 
PROPOSITION 10.1. Every locuily strut$ed O-logic program has a unique 
Herbrund perfect model. 1 
10.3. Equality-Minimal Models 
In Section 5 we saw that functional attributes can force equality among id-terms. 
For instance, 
sally[ father -+ bob] 
(15) 
sully [ father + chair( cs)] 
implies bob = chuir(cs). However, it well may be that bob = chair(cs) is not an 
intended result but rather is a consequence of a programmer’s error. Under the 
current semantics, the programmer would have to say bob # chair(cs) explicitly to 
let the system known that a run-time error must be generated if both of the O-terms 
in (15) are derived. Similarly, if father were an inconsistency-tolerant attribute, we 
would like to enable the system to derive sally[ father -+ T] from 
sully[ father -+ bob] 
sally[futher -+ chair(cs)]. 
(16) 
Again, at present, the inequality bob # chuir(cs) must be given explicitly to sanction 
such a derivation. 
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As mentioned in Section 5, one solution is to impose the closed world assumption 
on the equality predicate. To pull this plan through, we need to separate the 
equality definition from the rest of the program. 
Formally, an equality definition is a set of Horn clauses that involve equations 
only,, A data definition is any set of O-logic rules (possibly with negation in the 
body) that do not have equations in the rule-heads (but may have them in the 
body). A logic program P = EQ v DATA now consists of an equality definition EQ 
and a data definition DATA. 
For a pair of semantic structures, we write M<“q N, if for every ground equality- 
atom a = b, M + (a = b) implies N b (a = b). 
A model M of P is @-minimal if for every semantic structure N such that 
N ‘F EQ and N <eq M, it is the case that M4eq N. Note that to be +“q-minimal a 
model must possess a minimality property not just with respect to the models of P 
but also with respect to the models of EQ, which may be a much larger class of 
semantic structures. 
The desired semantics is now obtained as follows. Let P = EQ u DATA be a 
locally stratified program. A model of P is strongly perfect if it is gPerf-minimal 
within the class of all <‘q-minimal models of P. 
Now, the program (15) above has no strongly perfect model, unless the program- 
mer has explicitly stated that bob = chuir(cs). Indeed, in (15) the equality detini- 
tion, EQ, is empty. Therefore, for every pair of nonidentical id-terms, a and b, a # b 
holds in every Geq-minimal semantic structure of (15); in particular, bob # chuir(cs) 
holds true. Therefore, no such structure can be a model of (15) and thus no 
strongly perfect model exists. 
In contrast, (16) has a strongly perfect model in which suZZy[futher -+T] and 
therefore suZZy[futher c-) a] holds for every ground id term a (constructed in the 
language of the program in question). The reasoning here is similar to that for (15), 
but the conclusions are different: Every <eq -minimal semantic structure for (16) 
satisfies bob # chuir(cs). The O-term suZZy[futher -+ T] (hence suZZy[futher + a], for 
all a) can therefore be derived from axioms (9) in Section 5. 
PROPOSITION 10.2. Let P = EQ v DATA be a locally stratified program such that 
DATA contains no ordinary functional attributes (but it may contain inconsistency- 
tolerant functional attributes). Then P has a strongly perfect model. 
Proof: Since DATA has no functional attributes, P has Qeq-minimal models. 
In fact, it is easy to see that every ordinary perfect model of P u {axioms (9) of 
Section 5} is also a strongly perfect model of P. 1 
11. CONCLUSION 
We presented a logic that incorporates a number of most salient object-oriented 
features such as object identity, complex objects, and class/subclass classification. 
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We corrected the earlier problems with Maier’s O-logic [43] and extended it in 
several directions. In particular, we incorporated sets and deduction and provided 
a sound and complete proof procedure. We also outlined a theory of logic 
programs in O-logic and demonstrated that the main ideas carry over from the 
classical case. 
APPENDIX A 
We now present an algorithm for finding a complete set of mgu’s for a pair of 
O-terms. We remind (see Section 9.2) that it s&ices to find just one complete set 
of mgu’s, since any two such sets are equivalent to each other. It should be clear 
that since the structure of id-terms is exactly the same as that of the first-order 
terms, an mgu for any pair of unifiable id-terms can be found using any standard 
unification procedure. We will use this observation in Algorithm 1 below. 
Let T be a complex O-term of the form T’[funAl + P,, . . . . funA, + P,, 
setA, -H (R,,,, . . . . R1,kl}, . . . . setA, -H {R,,i, . . . . R,,k.}]. We will use attr(T) to 
denote the set {funA,, . . . . funll,, setA,, . . . . setA,) of attributes listed in T, 
atoms(T) will denote the set of constituent atoms of T. Also, if $ is an atom of the 
form T[attr + P] or T[attr --H {P}], then ~a/($) is defined to be the singleton set 
{P}. If + is of the form T[attr -H { }] then oal($) is empty. 
ALGORITHM 1. Finding a complete set of mgu’s. 
Zput. Pair of O-terms T, and T2 of the same kind (is-a, complex, typing). 
Output. A complete set Q of mgu’s of T, into T2. 
Notation. Let .4 be a collection of all mappings (1: atom -t atoms(T,)}, 
where for every 1(/ E atoms( T,) and 1 E /i, am($) = attr(l($)). 
Step 1 
Put 52 := { }. 
If T, and T2 are both is-a O-terms then 
If T, = T2 then return a := {id}, 
where id is a trivial mgu: id(X) =X for all variables. 
else terminate with failure. 
If T, gf S, : c, and T2 2’ S2 : c2 are typing O-terms then 
If c1 #c, or S, and S, are nonunifiable then terminate with failure. 
else return G := {mgu(S,, S,)}. % the standard mgu 
Step 2 
Let S, and S, be the ids of T, and T2. 
If S, and S, are unifiable then set 0 := mgu(S,, S,). 
else terminate with failure. 
% the standard mgu 
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Step 3 
If attr( T,) g attr( T2) then terminate with failure. 
For each mapping A EA do 
begin 
Put 0* := 8. 
For each atom t,G in atoms( T,) do 
Let II/’ be A(+). 
If ual(J/) = QI then do nothing. 
else if uul(t,b’) = @  then terminate with failure. 
else 
Let ual(ll/) be (P} and aal be (Q}. 
If ai and ai are unifiable 
then put c‘A: = mgu(a,(P), ai( 0 ul. 
else discard this c1 and 
%  standard unification 
jump out of the inner for each-loop to select another il 
Set s2 :=s)u (fan} 
end 
Step 4 
Return 52, a complete set of mgu’s. 
The complexity of Algorithm 1 is exponential, since the number of mappings in 
the loop in Step 3 may be as large as nsOrAES(II,I(T,) n2(setA)“1(Se’A), where n,(setA) 
is the number of id-terms in the set pointed to by the attribute setA in Ti; suttr(T,) 
denotes the collection of all set-valued attributes appearing in T,. It is easy to see, 
however, that when every attribute in T2 has only’ one occurrence and every set- 
valued attribute in T2 is associated with either the empty set or a singleton set (i.e., 
when n,(setA) 6 l), there is only one mapping in II and therefore only one mgu. 
The same is true if T, has no attributes at all (i.e., when n,(setA) = 0), since then 
Algorithm 1 exits in Step 2. Furthermore, if the number of elements in suttr(T,) is 
bounbed by a global constant (independent of T2) and if for all setA in suttr(T,) 
the number n,(setA) is also bounded, then. there is only a polynomial number of 
choices (in the size of T,) in the outer loop in Step 3 of Algorithm 1. Hence, the size 
of D is also polynomial. Section 9.8 explains that this latter case is characteristic of 
logic programming. 
EXAMPLE Al. Let T, =X[setA -M {Y}] and T, = u[setA ++ {b, c}] be given 
as aninput to Algorithm 1. Then the output will be a pair of mgu’s 8, = (X/u, Y/b) 
and 8, = (X/u, Y/c). The reader can verify that (0,) tI,> is a complete set of mgu’s 
of T, into T2. 
LEMMA Al. Algorithm 1 finds a complete set of mgu’s of T, into T2. 
ProoJ Clearly, all elements of D are mgu’s of T1 into T,, so we will only 
show that Sz is complete. Let 8 be a substitution such that O( T,) < O( T,). By the 
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definition of the ordering on O-terms (see Section 9.1), there is a mapping A: 
utoms( T,) + atoms( T2), such that for every I,$ E atoms( T,), the attributes of I+$ and 
A($) are identical and 8(ual(ll/)) ~0(oal(A($))). Hence, AEA. The substitution o1 
constructed in the outer for each-loop in Step 3 is a most general substitution such 
that I&($) E uuQA(ll/)) f or each I,JG E utoms( T, ). So, 8 must be less general than CJ~,, 
i.e., 8 = y 0 e1 for some substitution y. 
Summarizing, we have shown that (1) each element of Sz is a mgu; and (2) if 
there is a unifier 8 of T, into T,, then 8 is an instance of some element in Q. Hence, 
L2 is a complete set of mgu’s of T, into T2. 1 
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